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ABSTRACT
Due to the proliferation of hardware Trojans in third party Intellectual Property (IP)
designs, the issue of hardware security has risen to the forefront of computer engineering.
Because of the miniscule size yet devastating effects of hardware Trojans, few detection methods
have been presented that adequately address this problem facing the hardware industry. One
such method with the ability to detect hardware Trojans is Structural Checking. This
methodology analyzes a soft IP at the register-transfer level to discover malicious inclusions. An
extension of this methodology is presented that expands the list of signal functionalities, termed
assets, in addition to introducing a methodology for matching soft IPs to a functionality category,
termed Golden Reference Library Matching. Trojan detection methods are introduced that
utilize the results of Golden Reference Library Matching as well as internal characteristics of the
IP. This methodology is verified using benchmarks developed by a trusted third party.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Many semiconductor manufacturers in today’s world utilize the availability of third party
IPs rather than create an entire system in-house. This scenario poses a threat to the system’s
security as third party IPs are vulnerable to the inclusion of hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans
take the form of unwanted or malicious logic included within a hardware design. The insertion
of hardware Trojans allows the attacker to potentially gain possession of valuable information,
such as encryption keys, or prevent the correct operation of the design by a denial of service
attack. Hardware Trojans are often nearly impossible to detect during the testing and verification
process, as they are triggered by a very specific set of circumstances that only the attacker
knows.
The subject of hardware Trojan detection is an emerging field with few viable solutions
currently in place. The methodologies that have proven to be more successful involve sidechannel signal analysis in order to determine whether additional logic has been added to the
design. However, a hardware Trojan inserted to a design has the potential to be as small as only
a few logic gates and therefore cannot always be revealed through such analysis. Therefore, a
more thorough examination of the design is required to reveal the inclusion of hardware Trojans.
Previous work published in [10] has been performed in the area of Structural Checking,
and this research seeks to extend its capabilities. This method of analyzing soft IPs involves the
parsing of a design at the register-transfer level in order to create a representation of the internal
structure of the unknown IPs. Then, inclusions of malicious logic are identified by comparing
the internal structure of the unknown design to trusted designs as well as examining the internal
structure for suspicious connections. This strategy for detecting hardware Trojans has more
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advantages than other methodologies currently in use for multiple reasons. First of all, by
analyzing the design and detecting Trojans at the register-transfer level, the Trojan threats can be
prevented early in the manufacture process. This allows the semiconductor companies to reduce
the considerable amount of time and testing costs involved in the Trojan detection method using
side-channel signal analysis. Additionally, by parsing the internal structure of a design, the
Structural Checking methodology can detect smaller inclusions of malicious logic that the sidechannel signal analysis cannot.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this research is to significantly increase the number of assets used to
represent the role of a signal to provide differences among designs, as well as to create a
matching methodology where an unknown design matches to a trusted design from a Golden
Reference Library. In addition, for scalability, a hardware Trojan detection methodology is
developed by using the matching methodology and the characteristics of a soft IP as a specific
set of benchmarks.
1.3 Approach
Hardware designs, written in VHDL, are represented in the form of a collection of assets
used to describe the role of signals. External assets are manually assigned to primary port
signals of the design while internal assets are automatically assigned to signals immediately after
the parsing of the VHDL design. Following asset assignment, assets are filtered throughout the
designs along connections between signals. The result of the filtering process is a collection of
assets assigned to each signal, which combine to form an asset pattern. Asset patterns effectively
describe the characteristics of those designs, thus they can be used to compare to similar types of
designs.
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The representations of designs in terms of an asset pattern are collected and utilized in the
form of a Golden Reference Library (GRL). The GRL is composed of the asset patterns of
trusted designs that have been assigned a functionality. The asset patterns of unknown designs
are compared against the asset patterns of trusted designs in the GRL in order to determine the
functionality for the unknown design. Following the functionality assignment to an unknown
design, the unknown design is analyzed for hardware Trojans. The methodology of hardware
Trojan detection leverages multiple aspects to determine whether a Trojan is included in the
design. The asset pattern, the functionality matching and the characteristics of the registertransfer level (RTL) code are all utilized in the identification of hardware Trojans.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background
information regarding hardware Trojans along with similar research performed in the area of
hardware Trojan detection. Chapter 3 presents the unique methodology of hardware Trojan
detection, which is the thrust of the thesis. Chapter 4 summarizes the results of this methodology
of Trojan detection and provides analysis for the testing results. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes
the entire thesis in the form of a conclusion as well as provides potential areas of future work.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
Hardware Trojans must first be evaluated prior to an in-depth analysis of hardware
Trojan detection via the Structural Checking methodology. Specifically, an introduction to the
concept and classification of hardware Trojans is presented in order to understand the threat
model for the Structural Checking methodology. Additionally, existing Trojan detection
methodologies are evaluated in addition to show how the Structural Checking methodology
advances the capability of hardware Trojan detection.
2.2 Hardware Trojan Categorization
Before surveying strategies of hardware Trojan detection, the concept of hardware
Trojans needs to be explained. As [1] notes, “hardware Trojans are modifications to original
circuitry inserted by adversaries to exploit hardware or to use hardware mechanisms to gain
access to data or software running on the chip.” As noted previously, many semiconductor
companies rely on untrusted third party IPs. Therefore, even if they can ensure the trust of
circuitry developed in-house, the third party IPs included in the final design are susceptible to
Trojan insertion.
Characteristics exhibited by hardware Trojans allow for clear organization of hardware
Trojans. The three main categories of hardware Trojans as identified by [1] and [15] are
physical, activation, and action. The first category, physical, is broken down into multiple
subcategories, some of which are self-explanatory. The first subcategory describes the type of
Trojan, whether it involved gates added to the design or if gates were modified. The remaining
categories are self-explanatory and consist of the size, distribution and structure of the hardware
Trojan [15].
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The second major category, activation, is also described as the trigger for the hardware
Trojan. This category is further divided into externally-activated and internally-activated
Trojans. In the case of externally-activated Trojans, the adversary alone knows a very specific
input sequence resulting in the Trojan activation. Internally-activated Trojans are manifested in
multiple, self-explanatory forms, such as always-on and condition-based [15].
The final major category, action, is also described as the payload of the hardware Trojan
[15]. The malicious characteristics exhibited by the payloads of Trojans are further divided into
three categories—modify-function, modify-specification, and transmit-information [15]. The first
subcategory, modify-function, consists of attacks focused on augmenting the logic of the circuit
in order to change its intended behavior. The modify-specification subcategory describes attacks
intended to adjust certain properties of the circuit, such as clock frequency. The final
subcategory, transmit-information, involves attacks focused on leaking important information to
an attacker.
The Structural Checking methodology analyzes designs at the RTL and therefore is
limited to certain types of hardware Trojans. Specifically, detecting Trojans in the physical
characteristics subcategory is outside the scope of the Structural Checking methodology.
Therefore, the hardware Trojans detected by the Structural Checking methodology are Trojans
found at the RTL within the action and activation categories.
2.3 Hardware Trojan Detection Survey
Many Trojan detection methods have been proposed in previous research. The
methodologies proposed range from Trojan activation techniques to side-channel analysis. This
section gives a brief overview of the major Trojan detection methods.
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A major technique utilized in the detection of hardware Trojans involves the analysis of
side-channel characteristics of the circuit. Two of the major side-channel characteristics of a
circuit to be analyzed in the detection of hardware Trojans are power consumption and current.
A foundational work in the development of power analysis for the purposes of hardware Trojan
detection is presented in [17]. By establishing a power signature for a particular type of circuit,
the researchers found that hardware Trojans could be detected by identifying significant
deviations from the power signature. The research performed in [20] similarly focused on sidechannel characteristics, but limited the analysis to the current in isolated portions of the circuit.
An additional side-channel characteristic measured the register-to-register path delay. The
research performed in [18] establishes a technique for using the path delay measurement to
verify the absence of a hardware Trojan. All of these methodologies achieved success in
identifying larger hardware Trojans, but found difficulty in detecting smaller Trojans.
Another prominent methodology of Trojan detection involves the integration of sensors
to available space of a design layout. The research performed by [2] proposes the sensors
measuring the delays as a form of “self-authentication” to ensure that a design is Trojan-free.
This is very similar to the research performed by [3] using sensors to measure the variability of
path delays, although this research does not explicitly discuss using the on-chip sensors to detect
hardware Trojans. Measurements performed by a ring oscillator network measuring power
consumption on-chip coupled with statistical analysis allow the researchers in [4] to identify
malicious inclusions to hardware designs. The methodologies of using on-chip monitors yield
positive results in identifying specific types of Trojans, such as Trojans described by their
physical characteristics.
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An additional strategy of Trojan detection involves the purposeful activation of hardware
Trojans. By performing various activation techniques, one can find the designs with Trojan
inclusions by observing the Trojan payload. The researchers in [12] employ a probabilistic
approach to Trojan activation through applying randomized test sequences to activate hardware
Trojans. Another strategy of Trojan activation, as presented in [21], analyzes the circuit to
determine nets that are rarely activated and in turn using test vectors that activate those same
nets. A final strategy of Trojan activation found in [14] involves narrowing down the area of
potential Trojan inclusion to a specific region and testing that region thoroughly for Trojans.
While each of these methodologies achieved reasonable success, the strategy of Trojan activation
has limitations since Trojans often require a very unique and complex activation sequence.
Another category of Trojan detection involves providing greater trust to third party IPs.
The first of these methodologies, presented in [5], utilize functional vectors to remove trusted
signals from consideration in order to isolate Trojans to a specific region of the design. The
researchers in [6] employ an assortment of methodologies to identify hardware Trojans in third
party IPs, such as formal verification and sequential ATPG. Finally, the research performed in
[7] proposes a Design-for-Trojan-Test methodology that reduces the likelihood of Trojan
insertion by making potential Trojan trigger sequences difficult to implement. While the
research presented in this category yielded positive results, there are limitations to the number
and size of Trojans that they can detect.
Additional methodologies focus on the security of third party IPs from a software
analysis perspective rather than from a testing and verification perspective. The research
performed by [8] compares functionally similar IP blocks to determine if malicious logic is
present. The procedure by which this methodology compares the two IP blocks borrows from
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the concept of loop unrolling in order to represent the internal logic states of both designs.
Another methodology presented in [9] uses statistical analysis to assign values to signals based
on their vulnerability to Trojan insertion. The vulnerability values are determined by the level of
weight assigned to a statement as well as the observability of the statement. In doing so, a value
for the level of trust of an entire IP block can be determined. While the research performed by
both parties produce positive initial results, more advances must occur for these to be viable
options for hardware Trojan detection.
As discussed previously, the methodology of hardware Trojan detection employed in this
thesis is derived from the methodology of Structural Checking as originally presented in [19].
Previous work had been done in the area of modeling hardware threats in [16] and subsequently
incorporated into the Structural Checking methodology presented in [19]. Research performed
in [10] advanced the Structural Checking methodology through the creation of a software tool
performing VHDL parsing and expression analysis as well as an initial conceptualization of
hardware Trojan detection from a Structural Checking perspective. This research advances the
Structural Checking methodology further to include a more robust collection of assets, a Golden
Reference Library for functionality matching and hardware Trojan detection capability.
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3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The Trojan detection methodology presented in this research is derived from the
Structural Checking methodology developed in [10]. This methodology analyzes hardware
designs at the register-transfer level (RTL) in order to determine the presence of hardware
Trojans in the form of malicious logic. A high-level system diagram for this methodology can
be found in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: System Diagram
The design in question, written in VHDL, is first parsed in order to create a hierarchical
structure of the data paths within the design. The VHDL parser was available as an open-source
parser [22] and has been developed and implemented in a previous project as noted in [10].
Next, the primary port signals of the design are assigned assets, which denote the role of the
signal within the design. The collection of assets assigned to primary port signals was greatly
increased from the amount of assets found in the previous Structural Checking project. The
assigned assets are filtered throughout the circuit through direct connections of the primary
inputs and primary outputs determined by the VHDL parsing. Depending on the assets and their
locations, the design is categorized based on its functionality by comparing it to trusted RTL
designs in a Golden Reference Library (GRL). The GRL feature for categorizing designs was a
completely new innovation added to the Structural Checking project. Finally, potential hardware
Trojans within the design are identified by analyzing the results of the GRL categorization as
well as characteristics of the RTL code. The Trojan detection process was also a new addition to
9

the project from the previous Structural Checking methodology. This entire methodology has
been implemented and tested in the form of a graphical user interface that allows users to analyze
a potentially malicious design for hardware Trojans. The tool produces output reports that
present the results of hardware Trojan detection for user readability.
3.2 Assets
The concept of an asset was previously introduced in [10]. As [10] explains, an asset
describes the purpose of a signal within a design. This concept is a foundation of Trojan
detection, as it allows for signals to be represented in terms of a collection of assets. A signal’s
collection of assets will become important in later sections when dealing with Trojan detection.
Assets can be divided into two broad categories. The first category is termed internal
assets. Primary port signals and internal signals both receive internal assets via automatic
assignments. These assets are termed internal due to the fact that they refer to the way the
signals are internally used within a system. The other category of assets is termed external
assets. External assets are manually assigned to the primary port signals of a design.
3.2.1 Internal Assets
The first category of assets, internal assets, includes a set of assets that are automatically
assigned to all signals within the designs. The assignment of internal assets occurs following the
parsing of the RTL code by first looping through the code and searching for all logical
expressions. The signals used in each logical expression are then identified and assigned an
internal asset based on the role that it plays within the expression. Table 1 below shows a list of
the 16 internal assets that have been developed along with a description of each asset.
TABLE 1: Internal Assets
Asset
PROCESS_SENSITIVE

Description
Assigned to a signal contained within a process
sensitivity list.
10

TABLE 1: Internal Assets (Cont.)
Asset
Description
PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE Assigned to a signal being modified within a process
statement.
CONDITIONAL_DRIVING
Assigned to a signal contained within a conditional
statement.
CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN
Assigned to a signal being modified within a
conditional statement.
CONCURRENT_DRIVING
Assigned to a signal driving another signal via a
concurrent statement.
CONCURRENT_DRIVEN
Assigned to a signal being driven by another signal
via a concurrent statement.
CC_OPERATION_OR
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing an OR operation.
CC_OPERATION_AND
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing an AND operation.
CC_OPERATION_XOR
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing an XOR operation.
CC_OPERATION_NOR
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing a NOR operation.
CC_OPERATION_NAND
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing a NAND operation.
CC_OPERATION_XNOR
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing an XNOR operation.
CC_OPERATION_NOT
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing a NOT operation.
CC_OPERATION_A_ADD
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing an addition operation.
CC_OPERATION_MULT
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement performing a multiplication operation.
CC_OPERATION_SENSITIVE
Assigned to a signal being driven by a concurrent
statement using another type of logic than the types
previously listed.
The assets above can be broken down into three categories. The first category deals with
assets assigned to signals used in process statements. Certain internal assets are assigned to
signals based on whether the signal appears in a process sensitivity list or whether it is used
inside the process itself. The second category deals with assets assigned to signals used in
conditional statements. Similarly to the assets dealing with process statements, conditional
assets can be assigned to signals found within a conditional statement or to signals being
11

modified within a conditional statement. Finally, numerous assets are assigned to signals being
used within concurrent statements. These assets are assigned based on the logic used within the
concurrent statement. As a signal can be used in multiple types of expressions in RTL code,
multiple internal assets can be assigned to a signal.
3.2.2 External Assets
The second category of assets is external assets, and these assets are manually assigned to
primary port signals. As opposed to internal assets that describe how a signal is used internally
in the RTL code, external assets describe how a primary port signal is used. There are a total of
51 external assets that are distributed among several broad categories.
The first category contains assets describing data signals. Table 2 below shows the assets
within this category along with the definition of the specific asset.
TABLE 2: Data Assets
Asset
Description
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL Assigned to data signals within ALUs, adder, multipliers, etc.
DATA_MEMORY
Assigned to data signals being stored in memory.
DATA_PERIPHERAL
Assigned to data signals being used by peripheral units.
DATA_COMMUNICATION Assigned to data signals being used for communication
purposes by communication units.
DATA_ENCRYPTION
Assigned to data signals being used being encrypted by
encryption units.
DATA_SENSITIVE
This is the most general of the data assets and can be assigned
to signals containing data that does not fit any other category.
The second category consists of assets related to the timing of a system. Table 3 below
shows the assets within this category along with the definition of the specific asset.
Asset
SYSTEM_TIMING
SUBSYSTEM_TIMING
STATUS
DONE
HOLD
READY

TABLE 3: Timing Assets
Description
Assigned to the primary clock signal.
Assigned to a subsystem clock signal.
Assigned to a signal indicating the status of the system.
Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is finished.
Assigned to a signal indicating to hold an operation.
Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is ready.
12

Asset
BUSY
COUNT
WAIT
TIMER_CONTROL
CLOCK_CONTROL

TABLE 3: Timing Assets (Cont.)
Description
Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is busy.
Assigned to a signal used as a counter.
Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation must wait.
Assigned to a signal controlling a timer.
Assigned to a signal controlling the primary or subsystem clock.

The next category involves assets assigned to signals used for system control. Table 4
below shows the assets within this category along with the definition of the specific asset.
Asset
SET
RESET
READ
WRITE
SELECT
EXECUTE
LOAD
MODE
ENABLE
HANDSHAKING
SHIFT
INSTRUCTION
SYSTEM_CONTROL

TABLE 4: System Control Assets
Description
Assigned to a signal used to set a value.
Assigned to a signal used to reset a value.
Assigned to a signal used to perform a read operation.
Assigned to a signal used to perform a write operation.
Assigned to a signal used to perform a select operation.
Assigned to a signal indicating that an operation is to be executed.
Assigned to a signal indicating that a value is to be loaded.
Assigned to a signal indicating the mode of an operation.
Assigned to a signal used to perform an enable operation.
Assigned to a signal used in communication by way of a
handshaking operation.
Assigned to a signal indicating that a shift operation is to occur.
Assigned to a signal used as an instruction. This is the most general
form of this asset and should only be used when a more specific
asset does not describe the signal.
Assigned to a signal that is used in system control. This is the most
general system control asset and should only be used when a more
specific asset does not describe the signal.

The next category of assets is a subset of the previous category of system control assets.
These assets are specific to a certain type of subsystem. Table 5 below shows the assets within
this category along with the definition of the specific asset.
Asset
MEMORY_OP
DATA_OP

TABLE 5: Specific System Control Assets
Description
Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within
a memory subsystem.
Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within
a subsystem dealing with data.
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TABLE 5: Specific System Control Assets (Cont.)
Asset
Description
INTERRUPT_OP
Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within
an interrupt unit subsystem.
PROGRAM_COUNTER_OP
Assigned to a signal used to perform an operation within
a program counter.
INTERRUPT_CONTROL
Assigned to a signal used as system control within an
interrupt unit subsystem.
PERIPHERAL_CONTROL
Assigned to a signal used as system control within a
peripheral subsystem.
REGISTER_FILE_CONTROL
Assigned to a signal used as system control within a
register file subsystem.
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
Assigned to a signal used as system control within a
communication subsystem.
COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL Assigned to a signal used to handle a protocol within a
communication subsystem.
COMMUNICATION_STATUS
Assigned to a signal indicating the status of an operation
within a communication subsystem.
INTERRUPT
Assigned to a signal used to handle an interrupt requests.
The final category of assets is simply a miscellaneous category. These assets do not
clearly fit into any one category and are therefore grouped together in the miscellaneous
category. Table 6 below shows the assets within this category along with the definition of the
specific asset.
Asset
CRITICAL
COMPONENT
ADDRESS_SENSITIVE
CONSTANT
KEY
REGISTER
PROGRAM_COUNTER
ERROR_HANDLING
EXCEPTION_HANDLING

TABLE 6: Miscellaneous Assets
Description
Assigned to an asset that could lead to harm if an attacker gained
possession of it.
Assigned to an asset that refers to another component of a
system.
Assigned to an asset that describes the address used in a memory
subsystem.
Assigned to a signal that describes a value to be used as a
constant.
Assigned to a signal used as an encryption key in an encryption
unit.
Assigned to a signal used to handle data to be used in a register
file subsystem.
Assigned to a signal used as the value being manipulated within
a program counter.
Assigned to a signal that performs error handling.
Assigned to a signal that performs error handling.
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Asset
STATE

TABLE 6: Miscellaneous Assets (Cont.)
Description
Assigned to a signal that tracks the state of system.

3.2.3 Asset Assignment
As mentioned in the previous section, users assign external assets to the primary port
signals of a design. This requires the user to understand how the signal of a design is used in the
system. Oftentimes, the choice of external asset is very simple, as there is a direct correlation
between the external asset to be assigned and the signal it is assigned to. However, there are
cases in which the user must deduce the external asset to be used based on the closest match to
the functionality of the signal. Therefore, several rules should be considered when assigning
assets.
First of all, the most important rule in assigning external assets is that the most specific
asset appropriately describing the signal should be assigned. As the descriptions of the assets in
the previous section show, there are certain assets that are general in nature, such as
DATA_SENSITIVE and SYSTEM_CONTROL. These assets should only be assigned in the case
that no other assets best describe the functionality of a signal. For instance, when considering
the assignment of an asset to a data signal in an ALU, the more specific external asset
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL should be used rather than the general DATA_SENSITIVE asset.
Additionally, if there is not an exact asset describing a signal’s role within the system but there is
an asset functionally similar to the signal under consideration, then that asset should be assigned.
For example, when considering the asset assignment of a clear signal, the functionally similar
asset, RESET, should be assigned to the clear signal.
The second rule to consider when assigning assets involves the number of assets assigned
to a signal. Primary port signals can have multiple assets assigned to the same signal in the case
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the signal cannot be appropriately described by a single asset. For example, a signal may be
used to perform read/write operations. In that case, both the READ and WRITE assets should be
assigned to the signal in order to appropriately describe its functionality. However, the ideal
scenario is that a single asset can be assigned that appropriately describes the functionality of
that signal. This is especially important when considering the first rule above stating that the
most specific asset to describe a signal should be used. For example, if a signal is a data signal
within a communication unit, only the DATA_COMMUNICATION asset should be assigned,
rather than additionally assigning another data asset that may only partially describe the
functionality of the signal.
The final rule to consider when assigning assets involves asset assignment for system
specific assets. This rule is similar to the first in that it requires a user to assign the most specific
asset possible to describe a signal. More specifically, this rule involves assigning assets specific
to a type of system if the functionality of the system is known. For example, if an asset is used
as an instruction within an ALU, the general INSTRUCTION asset should not be assigned.
Instead, the more system-specific asset DATA_OP should be assigned. Even in the case that an
asset describes the functionality of the signal, the system specific asset should be used. For
example, if a read signal is being analyzed in memory unit, the MEMORY_OP asset should be
chosen rather than the READ asset. The assignment of system-specific assets aids in the future
step of functionality matching.
3.2.4 Asset Filtering
Following the VHDL parsing and assignment of assets, the next step in the process is to
filter the assets throughout the circuit. This involves passing the assets previously assigned to
the primary port signals to lower level signals based on the internal connections of the circuit.
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For example, if a primary input port signal directly drives an internal signal via a concurrent
statement, the internal signal would receive the assets assigned to the input signal. Filtering
occurs both from input to output and vice versa, meaning that assets can be passed from input to
output and from output to input. This process is repeated recursively until every connection
within the circuit has been reached. At this point, every signal within the circuit has been
populated with assets that describe all possible functionalities of the signal. The information
necessary to filter the assets is collected during the VHDL parsing. The development of the
methodology and implementation of asset filtering was previously described by [10].
3.2.5 Asset Optimization
An additional step following the filtering of assets through the circuit, termed asset
optimization, occurs in order to ensure a precise asset pattern. Asset optimization involves the
analysis of each individual port signal’s external and internal assets to ensure that there are no
redundant assets. As past analysis of asset filtering has shown, asset patterns for large designs
can be extremely large, resulting in every signal essentially having the exact same asset pattern.
Asset optimization corrects this issue by removing filtered assets that do not actually contribute
to the functionality of the circuit.
Asset optimization is only performed on the primary port signals of the circuit that have
been assigned assets. The internal assets of these signals are then analyzed to determine if the
signal in question is driving another signal or being driven by a signal. Certain assets are
removed based on whether the signal is driving another signal or being driven by another signal.
In the case of the signal being driven by another signal and the original signal contains a data
asset, the system control assets relevant to data operations are removed. For example, if a data
signal assigned a DATA_MEMORY asset has received a MEMORY_OP asset during the filtering
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process, the MEMORY_OP asset is removed from the collection of assets assigned to the data
signal. Conversely, in the case that a signal is driving another signal and the original signal
contains a system control asset, the data assets relevant to the system control operations are
removed. For example, if a system control signal assigned a MEMORY_OP asset has received a
DATA_MEMORY asset during the filtering process, the DATA_MEMORY asset is removed from
the collection of assets assigned to the system control signal. This process allows the true
functionality of the signal to represented with assets rather than allowing the filtered assets to
distort the functionality of the signal.
There are also certain optimizations that are performed regardless of whether the signal is
driving or being driven by another signal. As mentioned previously there are certain assets that
are very general in nature, such as DATA_SENSITIVE and SYSTEM_CONTROL. In the case
where one of these assets is present and other more specific assets are present, the general assets
are removed. For example, in the case that a signal is assigned a DATA_COMPUTATIONAL
asset and a DATA_SENSITIVE asset is filtered to the signal, the DATA_SENSITIVE asset will be
removed from the signal’s collection of assets. However, it is important to note that only filtered
assets can be removed through optimization while the assigned assets are permanent. The entire
process of asset optimization is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Asset Optimization Diagram
3.2.6 Asset Pattern
The results of the filtering and optimizing of assets is termed an asset pattern. Asset
patterns describe the system in terms of a collection of internal and external assets that have been
filtered throughout the circuit. This is accomplished by listing the internal and external assets
that have been assigned to individual signals. The collection of assets assigned to a specific
signal is termed an asset trace. The collection of asset traces forms an asset pattern for a system.
Asset traces originate from the external assets that are manually assigned to a signal and
the internal assets that are automatically assigned to a signal. Once the assets have been filtered
throughout the circuit, each individual signal contains a collection of assets that have been
assigned initially as well as assets that have been filtered to the signal. Each asset within the
asset trace is unique. This means that the asset traces do not repeat assets even in the case that an
asset has been both assigned and filtered to the signal. Additionally, each signal has both an
external asset trace as well as an internal asset trace. An example of an external asset trace found
in a communication unit can be seen below:
[DATA_COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL]
An example of an internal asset trace can be seen below:
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[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
Both of these examples show the list of external and internal assets that were both assigned and
filtered to a signal.
Asset traces are grouped into six separate categories based on the type of assets being
assigned and the type of signals the assets are being assigned to. The two types of assets are
internal and external, while the types of signals that the assets are being assigned to are primary
input/output signals and internal signals. Therefore, the categories can be seen in Table 7 below:
TABLE 7: Types of Asset Patterns
Asset Pattern Type
Description
input port signal external asset pattern
Collection of external asset traces assigned to top
level input port signals
output port signal external asset pattern
Collection of external asset traces assigned to top
level output port signals
internal signal external asset pattern
Collection of external asset traces assigned to
internal signals
input port signal internal asset pattern
Collection of internal asset traces assigned to top
level input port signals
output port signal internal asset pattern
Collection of internal asset traces assigned to top
level output port signals
internal signal internal asset pattern
Collection of internal asset traces assigned to
internal port signals
The combination of these six sets of asset traces forms the asset pattern of a single circuit.
The asset pattern represents the unique combination of assets that are used to describe a circuit
design. An example of an asset pattern of a SPI module can be seen below in Figure 3.
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[SYSTEM_TIMING]
[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
[RESET]
[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
[CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
[READ, WRITE]
[ADDRESS_SENSITIVE]
[DATA_COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL]
[DATA_COMMUNICATION]
[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN]
[INTERRUPT]
[SUBSYSTEM_TIMING]
[CONCURRENT_DRIVEN]
[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION]
[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL]
[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN]
[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION]
Figure 3: SPI Module Asset Pattern
As is indicated in this asset pattern, many of the assets are related to communication. It
could then be inferred that the circuit described by this asset pattern belongs to the category of
communication without the previous knowledge that it is a SPI module. This fact will be used in
future sections to match asset patterns to functionalities.
3.2.7. Asset Pattern Functionality
Following the creation of an asset pattern for a system, a functionality is assigned to the
design. As the name implies, the functionality assignment is intended to effectively describe the
purpose of the design. Table 8 below lists the types of functionalities that the design could be
assigned to.
Functionality
SHIFT_REGISTER
INTERRUPT_UNIT
COMMUNICATION
ENCRYPTION_UNIT

TABLE 8: Functionalities
Description
Assigned to a circuit being used to shift data in and out.
Assigned to a circuit handling interrupt requests.
Assigned to a circuit handling communication.
Assigned to a circuit being used to encrypt or decrypt data.
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TABLE 8: Functionalities (Cont.)
Functionality
Description
COMPUTATIONAL
Assigned to a circuit being used to manipulate data, such as an
ALU, adder or multiplier
TIMING
Assigned to a circuit responsible for controlling the timing of a
system.
CONTROL_GENERATION Assigned to a circuit used to handle system control.
REGISTER_FILE
Assigned to a circuit used to store data
PERIPHERAL
Assigned to a circuit handling peripherals other than
communication.
DECODER_ENCODER
Assigned to a circuit used to encode or decode data.
As the list indicates, many functionalities have direct correlations to assets that were
presented previously. This was intentional, as this aids in determining the functionality of a
particular design.
3.3 Golden Reference Library
The asset patterns generated by asset assignment and filtering are essential in the analysis
of unknown designs. A Golden Reference Library (GRL) is formed by obtaining asset patterns
from trusted IPs that in turn can be used to compare against unknown IPs to determine their level
of trust. The GRL contains files with characteristics of the individual designs that have been
deemed to be trusted. The unknown design is then compared to the GRL designs and assigned a
functionality based on the closest GRL design match. The resulting data is outputted in userreadable format.
3.3.1 Golden Reference Library Creation and Characteristics
The Golden Reference Library was created by first obtaining trusted designs for each
type of functionality. The asset pattern for each of the trusted designs are generated and added to
the GRL to be used as the golden references. Due to the fact that these are the basis of matching
unknown designs, a sufficient amount of trusted designs for each category must be chosen in
order to guarantee that an unknown design could match sufficiently to a trusted design or else be
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deemed untrusted. Obtaining designs for the GRL is an ongoing process as more trusted designs
can always be added to represent more types of designs. However, the designs currently present
in the GRL are sufficient to match many unknown designs.
The trusted designs were obtained through numerous sources. The main source of
designs was the website OpenCores [13], an open-source repository for hardware designs. Many
of their trusted designs were incorporated into the GRL. The remaining trusted designs were
either collected from additional online repositories or were simply created during the course of
the project. One potential issue that arose when creating the GRL is that there are numerous
ways to implement designs of a specific category, and it is impossible to find and implement all
possible designs. However, this issue is addressed by the addition of assets specific to a
functionality as well as allowing the GRL to be constantly updated with new designs. The
specific assets allow designs to be matched with functionalities closely related to those assets.
GRL files contain several important characteristics used in the matching process. The
main information used in this process is the complete asset pattern for that design. In order for
the asset pattern to be parsed by the tool, certain delimiters were used to identify the specific
portions of the asset pattern. The delimiters for each type of asset pattern can be seen in Table 9
below.
TABLE 9: Asset Pattern Delimiters
Asset Pattern Type
Delimiter
input port signal external asset pattern
>
output port signal external asset pattern
<
internal signal external asset pattern
/
input port signal internal asset pattern
>*
output port signal internal asset pattern
<*
internal signal internal asset pattern
/*
As the table shows, the addition of the symbol ‘*’ indicates that an asset pattern is an
internal asset pattern, while the absence of that symbol indicates that it is an external asset
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pattern. An example asset pattern with delimiters inserted can be seen in Figure 4 below. This
figure is the same asset pattern as the SPI module from before with delimiters.
>[SYSTEM_TIMING]
>*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
>[RESET]
>[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
>*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
>[READ, WRITE]
>[ADDRESS_SENSITIVE]
>[DATA_COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL]
<[DATA_COMMUNICATION]
<*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN]
<[INTERRUPT]
<[SUBSYSTEM_TIMING]
<*[CONCURRENT_DRIVEN]
<[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION]
<[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
<[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL]
/*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN]
/[COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, DATA_COMMUNICATION]
Figure 4: SPI Module Asset Pattern with Delimiters
The asset patterns generated by the asset filtering process are stored in files termed GRL
files with a “.grl” extension. Each GRL file is stored under the Golden Reference Library
directory. This directory is located such that it is easily found in order to be used later in the
GRL matching process. If additional trusted designs were generated by the asset filtering
process, the associated GRL file could simply be added to this directory.
3.3.2 Golden Reference Library Matching
The creation of the Golden Reference Library is used as the basis for matching unknown
designs to a functionality. Functionality matching is necessary for determining the level of trust
to be assigned to the unknown design. Therefore, a matching methodology was developed that
allows the unknown design to be matched to a known design in the GRL. The asset patterns of
the trusted designs found within GRL files provided a characteristic to be used for comparison
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between the unknown designs and the trusted designs. However, many factors of the asset
patterns must be analyzed in order to create an algorithm for matching. This section discusses
the various characteristics of the GRL matching algorithm along with examples of how portions
of unknown designs would be matched to trusted designs in the GRL.
3.3.2.1 GRL Matching Algorithm
As discussed in previous sections, the asset pattern generated by asset filtering contains
six separate characteristics based on the type of signal (input and output port signals and internal
signals) and the type of asset (internal and external). Therefore, during the matching of asset
patterns, each characteristic is analyzed and matched to a potential design. As Figure 5 below
indicates, the beginning of the matching process is to loop through each entry of the GRL in
order to compare the characteristics of each GRL entry to the unknown design. Each
characteristic is analyzed individually and assigned a percentage match that is then used to
determine the total match.

Figure 5: Golden Reference Library Matching High-Level Diagram
The match percentage of each individual characteristic is contained in a hash map using
the name of the GRL entry as the key and the match percentage as the value. There are six hash
maps as there are six characteristics used in the matching process. The values are obtained while
looping through the GRL entries and comparing the individual asset pattern characteristics of the
GRL entry to the unknown design. The matching of the individual characteristics is essentially
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an intersection of sets in order to determine the percentage of assets contained within the
unknown design with respect to each GRL entry.
While looping through the GRL entries, the individual asset traces of the asset pattern
characteristics are taken individually and compared to the asset traces of the same asset pattern
characteristics of the unknown design. For example, the first asset pattern characteristic of the
GRL entry, the input port signal external asset pattern, is broken up into individual asset traces
and compared to the input port signal external asset traces of the unknown designs. Each asset
trace is looped through individually in order to find the largest match between asset traces. The
largest match is found by finding the intersection of the two asset traces (many examples are
given below for clarification). Once the largest match is assigned to the individual asset traces,
they are added together and divided by the total number of asset traces in order to find the asset
pattern percentage match. This is summarized in the Equation 1 below.
(Eq. 1)
In order to clarify the matching process, several examples have been given in Table 10.
These examples show how each asset trace of an unknown design matches to an asset trace of a
GRL entry.
Case
1
2
3
4

TABLE 10: General Asset Trace Matching Examples
Unknown Design Asset Traces
GRL Entry Asset Traces
DATA_ MEMORY,
DATA_MEMORY, CRITICAL
CRITICAL
DATA_ MEMORY, CRITICAL
SYSTEM_CONTROL
DATA_ MEMORY,
CRITICAL,
DATA_ MEMORY, CRITICAL
SYSTEM_CONTROL
DATA_ MEMORY,
DATA_ MEMORY,
SYSTEM_CONTROL
SYSTEM_TIMING
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Match
100%
0%
67%
50%

Case 1 in Table 10 gives the simple scenario that both asset traces are identical. In this
case, the match is clearly 100%. Case 2 is also a simple example showing that the match will be
0% when the asset traces have no intersection. Case 3 shows the scenario in which the two asset
traces intersect on two assets; however, the GRL entry contains a third asset not found in the
unknown design asset trace, causing the final match to be 67%. Finally, Case 4 considers the
scenario in which one asset is shared while the other asset is different. This case yields a 50%
asset trace match. If these asset traces where combined to form an asset pattern for a specific
asset pattern characteristic, the final match for that characteristic could be easily determined by
averaging the percentages listed. Therefore, the asset pattern characteristic match would be
54.25%.
In certain instances, one of the characteristics of a design may be empty. For example, if
a design does not contain internal signals, then there will be no assets assigned to internal signals
and those asset pattern characteristics will be empty. In the case that both the GRL entry and the
unknown design both have the same characteristic as empty, the hash map containing the match
percentages is marked with a -1 value indicating that this characteristic will be left out of the
final matching.
3.3.2.2 GRL Partial Matching Algorithm
In order to gain a more precise indication of the match between asset traces, an algorithm
for partially matching asset traces was developed. This algorithm takes into account the fact that
there is occasional overlap among assets and therefore there must be a way to assign a
percentage match to these assets greater than zero. For example, when matching the
DATA_SENSITIVE asset to the DATA_COMPUTATIONAL asset using the normal intersection
set matching, the result would be a 0% match. However, due to the fact that these assets are

27

similar in nature, the matching percentage should be greater than 0%. This is the problem
addressed by the partial matching algorithm.
The partial matching algorithm is implemented during the matching of asset traces.
Using general intersection set matching, the assets are analyzed and assigned a value by
determining whether or not the assets found within one set matches the assets found in the other
set. Instead, partial matching runs each individual asset through a method that analyzes the asset
to determine if it is part of a subset of similar assets. The set of similar assets are then searched
for within the asset trace intended for matching to determine whether or not any are found. In
the case that another asset that is similar in nature to the asset in question is found in the other
asset trace, a 50% match is assigned for that individual asset. This 50% match is then factored in
with the remaining assets that are a part of the asset trace.
The partial matching algorithm uses certain subsets of assets to determine whether or not
an asset should receive a partial match. These subsets of assets can be found in Table 11 below.
TABLE 11: Partial Matching Asset Categories
SYSTEM_CONTROL DATA_SENSITIVE INSTRUCTION
SELECT
DATA_
DATA_OP
ENCRYPTION

STATUS
READY

READ

DATA_
COMMUNICATION

MEMORY_OP

DONE

WRITE

DATA_
COMPUTATIONAL

PROGRAM_
COUNTER_OP

HOLD

INSTRUCTION

DATA_MEMORY

INTERRUPT_OP STATUS

MODE
SET
RESET
ENABLE
EXECUTE
HANDSHAKING
LOAD

DATA_PERIPHERAL
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BUSY
WAIT

TABLE 11: Partial Matching Asset Categories (Cont.)
SYSTEM_CONTROL DATA_SENSITIVE INSTRUCTION STATUS
SHIFT
INTERRUPT_
CONTROL
PERIPHERAL_
CONTROL
REGISTER_FILE_
CONTROL
COMMUNICATION_
CONTROL
CLOCK_CONTROL
TIMER_CONTROL
As the table shows, there are four categories of assets that can be partially matched. The
four categories are represented by the assets listed in the top row of each column. The partial
matching algorithm consists of first identifying whether one of the assets listed in the top row is
contained within either the GRL entry asset trace or the unknown design asset trace. If one of
the assets is found in either asset trace, the other asset trace is parsed for one of the assets in the
column of the original asset found. If one of those assets is found, a 50% match is assigned for
this set of assets.
In order to clarify the partial matching algorithm, several examples are shown in Table 12
below, listing the two asset traces along with a partial match percentage.
Case
1
2
3
4
5

TABLE 12: Partial Asset Trace Matching Examples
Unknown Design Asset Traces
GRL Entry Asset Traces
DATA_MEMORY
DATA_ SENSITIVE
DATA_ MEMORY, DATA_
DATA_ SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE
DATA_ MEMORY
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL
ENABLE, SET
SET, SYSTEM_CONTROL
RESET
SET, SYSTEM_CONTROL

Match
50%
50%
0%
75%
25%

Case 1 provides the simple example of two assets that can be partially matched at 50%.
The matching scenario in Case 2 shows that the two DATA_ SENSITIVE assets are matched at
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100%; however, since the unknown design contains an additional asset, DATA_ MEMORY, the
final match is 50%. It is important to note with this example that since the DATA_SENSITIVE
asset in the GRL entry was matched with the DATA_SENSITIVE asset in the unknown design, it
could not be partially matched with the DATA_MEMORY asset. Case 3 shows that even though
the two assets are data assets, they are not partially matched. For a partial match to occur, one of
the assets had to be a DATA_SENSITIVE asset. Case 4 describes a scenario in which the SET
assets are matched at 100% while the ENABLE and SYSTEM_CONTROL assets are matched at
50%, resulting in a final match of 75%. Finally, Case 5 describes a scenario in which the
SYSTEM_CONTROL asset is partially matched to the RESET asset at 50%. Since the GRL entry
has one additional asset, the final match is 25%.
3.3.2.3 Functionality Considerations
In addition to the partial asset matching, an algorithm that considers the functionality of
the GRL entries was developed in order to take advantage of the precise nature of many of the
assets. The external assets of the unknown design can give an indication as to what functionality
that design may be. By searching for the functionality-specific assets assigned to the unknown
design, the algorithm takes into consideration the GRL entries with that same functionality and
weights them greater than the entries without that functionality assignment.
As mentioned, this aids in the final matching of the unknown design to a functionality.
During the analysis of individual asset pattern characteristics, the algorithm recognizes whether
or not one of these assets is contained within the asset pattern characteristic. In the case that a
functionality-specific asset is present, all of the GRL entries with the corresponding functionality
are given a weight of 1.5 in order to give these entries precedence. Therefore, the match
percentage for only that characteristic will be multiplied by 1.5. For example, in the case that the
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input port signal external asset pattern contains a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset, the match
percentage for the input port signal external asset pattern of all GRL entries of functionality type
encryption unit are multiplied by 1.5. However, the other asset pattern characteristics do not
necessarily receive the multiplier unless other functionality-specific assets are also contained in
those characteristics.
3.3.2.4 Final Matching
Once each individual asset pattern characteristic hash map has been filled with values
representing the individual asset pattern matches, the final asset pattern match for each GRL
entry can be determined. Each individual asset pattern characteristic is taken into account during
the final asset pattern match; however, not all of the asset pattern characteristics are weighted
equally. There are several reasons for this. The most important reason is that certain designs can
be implemented in several different ways. For example, the internal implementation of one ALU
may be completely different from that of another ALU even though they accomplish the same
purposes. However, both of the ALUs will have similar I/O port signal external assets.
Therefore, the I/O port signal external assets should be weighted higher than the internal
characteristics of the design, including the internal signal assets. An additional reason for having
larger weight for I/O port signal external assets is that the internal assets of multiples designs are
similar to each other even if the designs have different functionalities.
Now that it has been established that not all asset pattern characteristics should be
weighted the same, the next question to address is the amount of weight that each characteristic
should be given. After performing extensive testing in order to determine the proper weight, the
values seen in Table 13 below were finalized.
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TABLE 13: Asset Pattern Characteristic Weighting
Asset Pattern Characteristic
Weight
input port signal external asset pattern
3×
output port signal external asset pattern
3×
internal signal external asset pattern
1×
input port signal internal asset pattern
1×
output port signal internal asset pattern
1×
internal signal internal asset pattern
1×
As the table shows, the port signal external asset patterns receive the largest weight, three
times larger than any other characteristic (the weighting of the asset pattern characteristics and
the testing results will be discussed further in subsequent sections). Once each individual asset
characteristic values have been determined, the above weighting is applied to each characteristic,
producing the final match value for each GRL entry to the unknown design. As mentioned
previously, certain designs do not contain every asset pattern characteristic. Therefore, during
the final matching these characteristics are simply omitted and the remaining characteristics are
used to match an unknown design to the GRL entry.
3.3.3 Golden Reference Library Results
Following the generation of matching values of a GRL entry to an unknown design, an
output file is generated containing the results of the matching analysis. This file contains the
match percentage along with the average match for each functionality. An example of the output
file can be seen in Figure 6 below.
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i2c_master
Best Match: i2c : 92.5 (75.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0, 100.0)
Communication Match: 62
Computational Match: 26
Decoder/Encoder Match: 27
Interrupt Unit Match: 50
Control Generation Match: 13
Peripheral Match: 3
Register File Match: 17
Encryption Unit Match: 20
Shift Register Match: 17
Timing Match: 20
Figure 6: Golden Reference Library Match File
The first line of this file gives the name of the unknown design being analyzed, which in
this case is i2c_master. The second line gives the best GRL entry match, which in this case is
another i2c unit matching at 92.5%. This line also gives the matching percentage for each asset
pattern characteristic. The remaining lines list the average percentage match among all
functionalities with respect to the unknown design. As one would expect, the communication
functionality has the largest percentage match at 62%. Additional information can be added to
this file at the user’s discretion, such as the match value for every GRL entry.
3.4 Trojan Detection Algorithms
The final and most important component of analyzing unknown designs is the process of
Trojan detection. Several methodologies are employed in the detection of hardware Trojans.
First, the results of asset filtering are utilized in order to identify suspicious asset patterns. Asset
filtering can reveal suspicious connections between signals within the design and therefore is
essential in the identification of hardware Trojans. Another methodology by which hardware
Trojans may be identified consists of utilizing the functionality matching accomplished by the
Golden Reference Library in order to match an untrusted design to a blacklisted design.
Functionality matching also provides the opportunity of identifying suspicious connections
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among otherwise trusted instances. Finally, characteristics of the RTL code itself are analyzed in
order to detect specific hardware Trojans embedded within the logic of the circuit.
In order to implement the methodologies of Trojan detection, the entire design is parsed
and each signal is analyzed individually by applying certain heuristics for determining the
presence of a Trojan. A diagram of this process can be seen below in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Trojan Detection High-Level Diagram
Of course not all possible hardware Trojans are intended to be detected using these
methodologies, as new hardware Trojans are constantly being developed. However, since the
implementation of these methodologies was done in modular fashion, additional Trojan detection
methods may be added in the future with relative ease. The hardware Trojan designs used as the
basis of these methodologies can be found on Trust-Hub’s website [11].
3.4.1 Asset Pattern Algorithms
The first of the methodologies of Trojan detection, asset pattern recognition, consists of
evaluating the external and internal asset traces assigned to an individual signal. The internal
and external asset traces are used in conjunction to determine whether or not the signal is being
affected by a hardware Trojan. For instance, the external asset trace of a signal can be analyzed
to determine the external assets that have been filtered to a signal. In certain cases, a Trojan can
be identified by simply identifying that an external asset has been filtered to the signal, exposing
a suspicious connection between internal signals. Additionally, the internal asset trace assigned
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to a signal can be useful in identifying suspicious driving assets by determining the internal logic
affecting that signal.
The first type of Trojan detected using asset pattern recognition involves the analysis of
signals dealing with the timing of a design. One type of attack on a timing signal consists of a
SET or RESET asset being filtered to a signal that had been originally assigned a SYSTEM_
TIMING or SUBSYSTEM_TIMING asset. This scenario is an example of a denial of service
attack against a timing signal of a design, as the set or reset signal could disable the timing of the
circuit. This attack is detected by analyzing the asset traces of the timing signals and searching
for filtered assets such as SET and RESET.
Additional Trojan detection methods involving asset pattern recognition identify
malicious logic being implemented within encryption units. The first method involves
identifying the modification of an encryption unit key by an attacker. The benchmarks
developed by Trust-Hub specifically address this potential Trojan [11]. If an attacker were able
to modify the encryption key, then the he or she would be able to decrypt any message being
encrypted by the encryption unit. This attack is identified by detecting the internal asset trace
assigned to a signal with a KEY external asset. If the internal asset trace contains any assets
indicating that the signal has been modified, such as a CONCURRENT_DRIVEN asset, the signal
is known to have been modified. Therefore, the signal containing these assets is flagged as
malicious. Another attack involving encryption units consists of the encryption key being leaked
to the output. In this scenario, an attacker could gain access to the key of the encryption unit by
using a certain trigger sequence. This type of attack is detected by analyzing the output port
signal external asset pattern to determine if a KEY asset has been filtered to any of the outputs. If
this scenario has occurred, the signal that has received a KEY asset is flagged as malicious.
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Another asset pattern algorithm involves the analysis of signals containing CRITICAL
assets. Since CRITICAL assets are intended for signals that are to be protected from leaking
information to attackers, these signals are extremely important to protect. Therefore, one of the
Trojan detection methods checks the outputs of all circuits to see if a CRITICAL asset has been
passed to it. If this is the case, then that output is marked as susceptible to critical information
leakage. A similar Trojan detection method analyzes the input and output signals of a top-level
design. For each of these signals, this method checks the assigned assets and compares them to
the filtered assets. In the case that the set of filtered assets are not contained within the set of
tagged assets, it is possible that a suspicious connection has been made with one of the signals in
question. In this case, the signal is marked as suspicious and presented to the user for further
inspection.
The final Trojan detection method pertaining to the analysis of asset patterns involves
analyzing the primary port signals of the unknown design. This method checks the assets that
have been assigned to the primary signals and compares them to the filtered assets of the same
signal. Due to the fact that malicious logic could be inserted into the unknown design,
unexpected assets could be filtered to the primary signals. In the case that the filtered assets are
not contained within the set of assets that have been assigned to the signal, the port signal is
marked as being connected to malicious logic within the unknown design.
3.4.2 Functionality Assignment Algorithms
The next set of Trojan detection algorithms consists of analyzing the functionality
assigned to a design during GRL matching. Functionality assignment can be leveraged in
several ways in order to detect the inclusion of a hardware Trojan. First, the process of GRL
functionality matching can reveal that a design has been compromised by Trojans by matching
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the design to a blacklisted functionality. Additionally, functionality assignment can reveal
suspicious connections between instances that otherwise would seem harmless. Finally, the
functionality assignment, coupled with asset pattern recognition, can reveal information leakages
in large designs.
3.4.2.1 Blacklisted Functionalities
The first category of functionality algorithms used to detect Trojans incorporates a
blacklist of Trojan-infested designs. The use of a blacklist to detect Trojans is a natural
extension of the Golden Reference matching presented previously. Rather than matching an
unknown design to a trusted design that is a part of the whitelisted GRL, the Golden Reference
matching analyzes the unknown design to determine if it matches to a blacklisted functionality.
The blacklist contains designs that are known to contain Trojans. Therefore, if an unknown
design matches to a design containing Trojans rather than a trusted design, the unknown design
is labeled as suspicious. The blacklisted designs were accumulated by creating asset patterns
from the Trojan-infested examples developed by Trust-Hub [11].
A list of the blacklist functionalities can be seen in Table 14 below. As the table
indicates, several of the blacklisted functionalities are similar to the whitelisted functionalities
noted previously. Therefore, the blacklisted functionalities are necessary to detect small
differences in implementation between legitimate designs and Trojan-infested designs.
TABLE 14: Blacklist Functionalities
Functionality
Description
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT Assigned to Trojan-infested encryption units leaking
TROJAN_TRIGGER
Assigned to Trojan triggers designed to initiate Trojan
attacks in other entities
TROJAN_SHIFT_REGISTER
Assigned to Trojan-infested shift registers
TROJAN_COMMUNICATION Assigned to Trojan-infested communication units
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3.4.2.2 Suspicious Connections
Another aspect of functionality detection that can be utilized to detect Trojans is the
identification of suspicious connections between instances. After first assigning functionalities
to unknown entities and sub-entities of a design, the connections between the instances of the
entities can be analyzed to determine whether or not a Trojan is present. Occasionally, an
instance found in a legitimate design can be used as a trigger to leak information.
Several suspicious types of connections are specifically searched for during the Trojan
detection process. The first two involve suspicious connections involving an encryption unit.
Certain instances within an encryption unit can allow information leakage if an activation
sequence is coded. The first of these connections involves the use of a shift register to leak data
from the encryption unit. This scenario has been implemented in one of Trust-Hub’s
benchmarks. Another connection that allows information leakage from an encryption unit
involves a counter instance being used as a trigger.
Another functionality that is susceptible to this type of attack is the register file. Since
the register file stores data, an attacker may seek to gain access to the data via a hardware Trojan.
Lower level connections of a register file could be used as a trigger to gain access to this data.
Similarly to the encryption unit Trojan detection methods, the register file entities are searched to
uncover possible lower level connections with shift register or counter functionalities. In all of
these cases, the malicious connection is identified by first starting with the top-level entity of an
analyzed design and recursively searching for all connections between entities of the design. If a
higher level entity, such as the encryption unit or register file, contains a lower-level connection
between entities that could serve as a trigger, such as a counter or a shift register, then the lowerlevel entity is marked as malicious and presented to the user for inspection.
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3.4.2.3 Functionality Detection with Asset Pattern Recognition
The final category of functionality-based Trojan detection methods involves the
additional information of the asset pattern in order to identify Trojans. This additional
information assists in the detection of information leakages as it allows for identification of
specific assets found within suspicious functionalities. Due to the fact that the external assets
were developed and intended for specific functionalities, if one of the specific assets was found
outside of the designated functionality, malicious connections between instances could be
present in the RTL code. One of the Trojan detection methods of this category involves the
leakage of an encryption unit key. If an encryption key were found outside of an encryption unit,
there would be a strong indication that an attacker is trying to obtain the key and decrypt
messages from the encryption unit. Additionally, other types of assets are verified to be
contained only within designated functionalities in order to guarantee that there are no suspicious
connections between instances. By analyzing the individual signals of a design and comparing
them to the functionality of that design, these types of attacks can be recognized and reported.
For example, another Trojan detection method within this category consists of the analysis of
interrupts being found outside interrupt units. Interrupt signals found within certain
functionalities, such as TIMING and CONTROL_GENERATION, could be used to disrupt the
control of the design by a malicious attacker. The attacker could send a false interrupt to trigger
an unwanted state. Therefore, if an interrupt is filtered to an entity that typically does not
process interrupts, the interrupt signal is marked as being malicious.
3.4.3 RTL Characteristics
The final category of Trojan detection algorithms consists of parsing the RTL code to
discover malicious logic inserted by attackers. Oftentimes such logic will consist of various
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Trojan triggers, such as time bomb counters or finite state machines. These triggers initiate the
leakage of data or denial of service. After recognizing potential triggers during the parsing of the
RTL code, certain algorithms are applied to the signal in question in order to determine its
legitimacy. These algorithms also consist of analyzing the external and internal asset trace
assigned to the signal.
The first category of Trojans detected using RTL code consists of denial of service
attacks. Denial of service attacks are extremely prevalent in hardware against such signals as
clocks and interrupts and result in a portion of the circuit becoming unavailable due to malicious
logic. Detecting denial of service attacks involves the analysis of individual signal assignments.
A common scenario in which a signal is the subject of a denial of service attack consists of the
attacker substituting a Trojan signal for the actual signal. Consequently, the intended signal does
not have an internal asset pattern as it is a floating signal in the design and the Trojan signal is
taking its place. Therefore, denied signals can be recognized by identifying the internal asset
trace for internal assets. If there are no internal assets indicating that the signal drives or is
driven by another signal, then that signal is being denied and is marked as such. Additional
denial of service attacks can be applied to encryption keys. Attackers could potentially modify
the encryption key and could use a different key known only to them. This is detected by
analyzing the encryption key signal and determining whether it has been modified.
Another category of Trojans detected using RTL code involves time bomb counters.
Time bomb counters are used as a trigger for many types of Trojan attacks, such as information
leakage or denial of service. The signals used to implement time bomb counters can be
identified by examining the structure of the RTL code. Each signal is parsed to determine
whether it serves as a counter within the design. If so, additional verifications are applied to
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determine whether the signal is being used as a Trojan trigger. This is accomplished by checking
the internal asset trace of the signal to determine whether it conditionally drives another signal.
If this is the case, the signal is marked as a potential time bomb counter and the signal that is
triggered by the counter is marked as a susceptible to a time bomb counter. A separate Trojan
detection method related to time bomb counters also performs a verification to determine
whether the signals being conditionally driven by the counter is connected to the output. While
the previous time bomb counter detection method targets all types of Trojan attacks, this
detection method specifically targets information leakage attacks that result in a suspicious
driving assignment to an output signal. If the time bomb counter is conditionally driving an
output, the counter is marked as a trigger for an information leakage attack and the susceptible
signals are also noted. Trust-Hub provides several examples dealing with time bomb counters,
and these were used for testing this methodology.
An additional category of Trojan detection methods involving RTL code consists of finite
state machine detection. Trojans can be implemented by attackers in the form of a finite state
machine (FSM) with an unwanted state that is only entered in rare conditions. The result of the
trigger condition can be information leakage or denial of service. The first detection method
involving an FSM examines the conditional signal used to determine the state of an FSM. The
number of states in the FSM is also examined to determine if it matches the number of cases
possible based on the size of the conditional signal. In the case that there is not an OTHERS state
listed, a Trojan could be implemented in the RTL code by having an unwanted state that would
typically be sent to the OTHERS state. Therefore, the FSM is marked as suspicious.
Additionally, the FSM is checked to guarantee that every possible state is accounted for as
defined by the size of the conditional signal. In the case that there are fewer states than the
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signal allows, the FSM is marked as suspicious. This is due to the fact that an attacker could
gain access to the gate-level netlist and insert an additional state to perform an unwanted task.
These FSM detection methods are used as warnings against potentially malicious logic being
implemented by an attacker and indicate to the user that the FSM should be verified as secure.
Several more Trojan detection methods involve analysis of RTL code. First, the
assignment statements of individual signals are checked for trigger sequences. For example, an
assignment such as “X <= Y(0) AND Y(1) AND Y(2)” is a potential Trojan activation sequence
for the signal X as it only goes high in the case that the Y vector reaches the value “111.” This
type of signal assignment could be a Trojan trigger sequence implementing a denial of service or
information leakage attack. However, additional criteria must be met in order to mark the
assignment as suspicious. The signal X must also be triggering a process or driving a conditional
statement. This can easily be verified by analyzing the internal asset trace assigned to the
potential trigger signal. If the signal X contains an internal asset indicating that it triggers
another signal, the signal assignment of X is marked as suspicious. Additionally, any other
signal being driven by X is marked as susceptible to a Trojan attack.
One final Trojan detection method using RTL code involves the detection of extra
circuitry added to a design. An attacker often inserts extra circuitry in order to increase the
payload and/or perform unnecessary switching activities. Several examples provided by TrustHub implement attacks of this nature. While not every scenario of adding circuitry can be
detected by this methodology, the examples provided by Trust-Hub have been tested and
detected. In Trust-Hub’s examples, an entire instance is being used as additional circuitry within
a design. However, the instance used as additional logic does not contain outputs as it only
performs unnecessary switching. Therefore, the detection method analyzes the instances to
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determine if output signals are present. If no outputs are present, the instance is marked as an
addition of malicious logic.
3.4.4 Trojan Detection Report
After performing all Trojan detection methods, a list of Trojans is compiled and
presented in user-readable format. An example of a portion of a Trojan detection report can be
found in Figure 8 below.
Trojan Information for:
RSACypher:
Type of Trojan found: KEY_LEAK
Entity:
RSACypher
Instance:
Top_Level_Instance
Signal:
inExp
Type of Trojan found: ENCRYPTION_UNIT_LEAK
Entity:
RSACypher
Instance:
Top_Level_Instance
Signal:
cypher
Figure 8: Trojan Detection Report
The Trojan detection report contains specific information about each Trojan present in
the design. In this example, the top of the report lists the name of the entity being analyzed,
RSACypher. This entity is a Trojan-infested encryption unit implementing the RSA algorithm.
A portion of the report shown lists two different Trojans present in the design, KEY_LEAK and
ENCRYPTION_UNIT_LEAK. In addition to the Trojan type, the output report also lists the
entity, instance and signal that are being affected by the Trojan. In this example, both Trojans
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are being applied to the RSACypher entity. In some cases, additional information is added to the
output report. An example of this can be seen in Figure 9 below.
Type of Trojan found: TIME_BOMB_COUNTER
Entity:
input_output
Instance:
Top_Level_Instance
Signal:
TIMER
Type of Trojan found: TIME_BOMB_SIGNAL
Entity:
input_output
Instance:
Top_Level_Instance
Signal:
SECRETKey
Driving Signal:
TIMER(15)
Figure 9: Trojan Detection Report with Driving Signals
In this example, a time bomb counter has been detected by the methodology. Therefore,
the output report notes the signals that contribute to the implementation of the Trojan. As the
report indicates, the TIMER signal is used as the time bomb counter to leak the SECRETKey.
Therefore, the Trojan detection report also lists the “Driving Signal” used to leak the
SECRETKey signal for the user to know which signal is being affected by the time bomb
counter. In this case, multiple Trojans are present in the same design.
3.5 GUI Implementation
The entire methodology of hardware Trojan detection is implemented using a Java-based
GUI. This tool allows a user to easily navigate to a VHDL file to be analyzed for Trojans. The
main GUI home screen can be seen below in Figure 10.

44

Figure 10: GUI Home Screen
The left side of the screen indicates the steps that must be initiated by the user in order to
perform the methodology while the right side keeps a log of the entire process. Each individual
step is fairly self-explanatory. The colored dots next to the step indicate the status of each step.
A green dot indicates that the process has been finished, a yellow dot indicates that the step is
ready to be initiated and a red dot means that previous steps must be completed before the step
can be initiated. Step 1 allows the user to browse to the top-level file and parse the VHDL code.
In the screenshot of the GUI shown above, this step has already been initiated and logged on the
right side of the screen. The second step allows the user to assign external assets to the primary
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port signals of the chosen design. The external assets can either be assigned manually or
imported from an asset assignment file (the third step is used to assign specific internal assets for
another project). After assets have been assigned, the fourth step initiates both asset filtering and
GRL matching. At this point, the output report giving the results of GRL matching is generated.
The final step in the process is to analyze the design for Trojans. The results of the Trojan
detection are also written to a file for the user to examine.
During the second step of the tool, the user has the option of assigning assets manually.
If this option is chosen, the dialog box found in Figure 11 appears.

Figure 11: External Asset Assignment Dialog Box
As the screenshot shows, the user has the option of choosing any primary I/O port signal
from the list on the left side of the screen. On the right side of the screen, the user has the option
of assigning an asset to the selected signal with the “Assign Asset” button. If this button is
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selected, an additional dialog box appears giving the entire list of assets for the user to choose
from. Additionally, the user could remove an asset that was accidentally assigned with the
“Remove Asset” button. Once all assets are assigned the user has the option to save the asset
assignments to a “.asset” file for future usage. Finally, a log is shown at the bottom of the dialog
box to allow the user to track the assets that have been assigned.
Several output reports are generated while using the tool. Following the fourth step in the
process, the percentage match file is generated along with a GRL file for each entity and subentity of the design being run. Both of these files are in the “OutputFiles” directory, which is in
the same location of the tool. The other generated file is the Trojan detection report, which can
be found in the “TrojanFiles” directory in the same location as the tool.
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
The individual portions of the Trojan detection methodology were tested and analyzed
concurrently with their development. The majority of the testing focused on collecting results of
the GRL matching and Trojan detection methods and guaranteeing that they performed as
expected. The Trust-Hub benchmarks were instrumental for the testing of the individual Trojan
detection methods. After ensuring the correctness of these methods, they were tested on larger
designs to ensure that they could detect multiple Trojans in the same large design.
4.2 GRL Matching
The Golden Reference Library methodology for matching unknown designs to entries in
the GRL required significant testing in order to ensure that the matching produced correct
results. The first step in testing the matching was to optimize the matching specifications,
particularly with regard to the weighting of the asset pattern characteristics of the design. Once
the matching methodology was finalized, many unknown designs were tested by matching to a
GRL entry. An example is given to show the process by which an unknown design is matched to
a GRL entry along with the results of the matching.
4.2.1 Asset Pattern Weighting
The weighting of the individual asset pattern characteristics was discussed in detail in the
methodology section. As noted, the external asset patterns of the input and output port signals
were given precedence over all other asset patterns by multiplying their match value by three.
This value was obtained through two guiding principles as well as trial and error.
The first principle in establishing a weighting value for each asset pattern characteristic is that
port signals are the most important in determining the functionality of an unknown design.

48

While the internal implementation of a functionality type can vary, the port signals often share
the same characteristics. For example, Figure 12 below shows the port signals of an ALU. As
the list of port signals show, there are two input data vectors and one output data vector.
Additionally, the design contains an operation signal as well as a carry out and a flag. For
comparison, Figure 13 shows the port signals of a different ALU.
entity ALU_VHDL is
port
(
Nibble1, Nibble2 : in std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
Operation : in std_logic_vector(2 downto 0);
Carry_Out : out std_logic;
Flag : out std_logic;
Result : out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0)
);
end entity ALU_VHDL;
Figure 12: First ALU Port Signals
entity simple_alu is
port( Clk : in std_logic; --clock signal
A,B : in signed(7 downto 0); --input operands
Op : in unsigned(2 downto 0); --Operation to be performed
R : out signed(7 downto 0) --output of ALU
);
end simple_alu;
Figure 13: Second ALU Port Signals
As the port signals of the second design show, there are many similarities between the
two ALUs. Each ALU contains an operation signal as well as two data input vectors and a result
output vector. If the specific assets of DATA_COMPUTATIONAL and DATA_OP are assigned
to these signals, the port signal asset pattern matches will be nearly identical. However, the
internal logic of the ALU designs consists of vastly different implementations resulting in
completely different internal asset patterns. If the internal asset patterns of the designs were
weighted the same as the port signal asset patterns, the close match of the port signal asset
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patterns would cancel with the poor match of the internal asset patterns. Therefore, it would not
indicate that each design belongs to the same category. Thus, the weighting for the port signal
asset patterns should be greater than the internal asset patterns.
After establishing that the port signal asset patterns should be given greater weights than
the internal asset patterns, the next question is how much weight they should be given. Based on
the previous principle, there is no identifiable limit to the weight given to a port signal.
Therefore, the second principle gives guidance to an approximate limit for the weight of port
signals. The second principle states that the internal asset patterns reveal the inclusion of
malicious logic, and therefore must also carry weight in order to match to blacklist designs
containing Trojans.
The testing of values for the weight of the individual characteristics consisted of trial and
error with multiple weighting values. After implementing multiple weighting values, the two
options that resulted in the best matches were between two and three as the weight factor to the
port signal asset patterns. The two options were compared by running the same design through
the matching process using both values and comparing the results. Rather than only comparing
the value of the closest matched design, the average match value for entire functionality
categories were examined. In this way, the improvement of using certain values as a weight
factor was easier to determine. After further comparison between these two options, the
weighting value of three produced the closest match. Noticeable improvement was seen across
multiple types of designs in the desired functionality category. More importantly, the average
match values for the categories other than the matched functionality were significantly lower
with the weight value of three than that of two.
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4.2.2 GRL Matching Example
The following example proves the effectiveness of the GRL matching methodology as
well as illustrating the process of matching an unknown design to a GRL entry. As mentioned in
the methodology section, an unknown design is analyzed first through the parsing process
followed by asset assignment and filtering to produce an asset pattern. The unknown design
chosen to illustrate the matching methodology is a basic UART communication module. The
primary I/O signals of the design can be seen in Figure 14 below.
entity uart is
port (
clk: in std_logic;
reset: in std_logic;
rx_data: out std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
rx_enable: out std_logic;
tx_data: in std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
tx_enable: in std_logic;
tx_ready: out std_logic;
rx: in std_logic;
tx: out std_logic
);
end uart;
Figure 14: UART I/O Port Signals
Following the parsing process, assets were assigned to each port signal. The assignment
of the assets was fairly straightforward. The assigned assets are in Table 15 below. After
filtering the assets throughout the circuit, the asset pattern found in Figure 15 was produced.
Due to the specificity of the assets, the majority of the assets assigned to this design are directly
involved in the process of communication. Therefore, during the matching phase of the
methodology, the communication functionalities should theoretically have the highest match
value.
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TABLE 15: UART Asset Assignment
Signal
Asset
clk
SYSTEM_TIMING
reset
RESET
rx_data
DATA_COMMUNICATION
rx_enable
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
tx_data
DATA_COMMUNICATION
tx_enable
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
tx_ready
COMMUNICATION_STATUS
rx
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
tx
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
>[SYSTEM_TIMING]
>*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
>[RESET]
<[DATA_COMMUNICATION]
>[DATA_COMMUNICATION]
>*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE]
>[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
<[COMMUNICATION_STATUS]
<[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
/*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN]
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN]
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
/[DATA_COMMUNICATION]
/[COMMUNICATION_CONTROL]
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE]
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
/[COMMUNICATION_STATUS]
/*[PROCESS_SENSITIVE, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING]
/*[CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVING,
PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE]
Figure 15: UART Asset Pattern
The matching process iteratively compared the asset patterns of GRL entries to the asset
pattern of the UART design. As expected, the communication functionalities matched as closely
as the unknown design. In fact, the top five closest matches have communication functionalities
and matched with a value of 80% or greater. The GRL entry with the closest match is an
interesting case study for understanding the matching process. All of the asset pattern
characteristics dealing with external assets (input port signal, output port signal and internal
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signal) received a 100% match. This occurs because of the specific assets and the functionality
multiplier.
However, the internal signals have a variety of matching values. The internal asset
pattern of the input signals matched at 75%, the internal asset pattern of the output signals
matched at 0%, and the internal asset pattern of the internal signals matched at 78%. The 0%
match for the internal asset pattern characteristic of the output signals illustrates an important
point in understanding the matching algorithm and the weighting of the asset pattern
characteristics. Although the remaining asset pattern characteristics have a high percentage
match, the internal asset pattern of the output port signals has a 0% match because the two
designs were coded differently in HDL. While the output signals of the basic UART entity
assigns values to the primary outputs inside a process block, the design matched with the UART
design uses concurrent statements and conditional statements to assign values to its outputs.
Therefore, even though the functionality of the designs is clearly the same, the internal asset
patterns are greatly different. As a result, the weighting of the asset pattern characteristics
heavily favors the external asset pattern characteristics. After the weighting of the asset pattern
characteristics is applied, the final match is 85%, which gives a fairly certain indication that the
functionality of the design is the communication functionality as was expected.
4.3 Trojan Detection
Thorough testing of the Trojan detection strategies presented in the methodology section
required designs with Trojans inserted. The Trust-Hub benchmarks [11] were used as a basis to
perform unit testing of individual Trojan detection methods. These benchmarks focused on
encryption units and communication units containing Trojans performing information leakage or
denial of service attacks. In addition to the benchmarks created by Trust-Hub, several custom
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benchmarks were developed in order to test the remaining Trojan detection methods that could
not be tested with the examples provided by Trust-Hub. After verifying the functionality of each
Trojan detection method through unit testing, large designs with multiple Trojans inserted were
used to further test the Trojan detection methods and guarantee that all Trojans in the design
could be detected. The first of the large designs was a crypto core developed by Trust-Hub with
Trojans already inserted. The second was an open-source microcontroller that had several
custom Trojans that were inserted into the previously Trojan-free design.
4.3.1 Trust-Hub Benchmarks
The Trust-Hub benchmarks provide a useful tool for the unit testing of Trojan detection
methods. While not all of the Trust-Hub benchmarks are useful as they only contain gate-level
netlists, a significant portion contain the RTL code required to test the Trojan detection methods
of this methodology. Along with a Trojan-infested design, Trust-Hub includes a design without
the Trojan included so that the two designs can be compared. Some of the benchmarks were
written in Verilog rather than VHDL. By using the XHDL tool [22], the Verilog designs could
be converted into VHDL in order to be useful for testing.
The first category of the Trust-Hub benchmarks consists of four RSA encryption units
each containing a different type of Trojan. The first of these benchmarks, called BasicRSAT100, leaks the encryption key when a specific plaintext string is entered. The Trojan-infested
portion of the design can be seen in Figure 16 below.
if indata = x"44444444" then
cypher <= key;
-- Trojan leaks the private key through cypher output bus
else
cypher <= tempout;
-- set output value
end if;
Figure 16: Encryption Unit Key Leak VHDL Example
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As the VHDL code shows, the key leaks when the string “44444444” is entered. Using
traditional testing methods, this scenario is very difficult to discover, as it is a very rare
condition. However, by performing asset assignment and filtering, the asset pattern of the
ciphertext output is shown to contain a KEY asset. Therefore, the Trojan detection method
designed to detect encryption unit leaks identifies the Trojan in this design.
This benchmark also serves as a unit test for another Trojan detection method. Since the
Trojan is inserted into the design, the encryption key, which is assigned the external asset KEY,
is directly driving the ciphertext, which is assigned the external asset DATA_ENCRYPTION.
Therefore, the Trojan detection method ensuring that the filtered assets are contained within the
tagged assets identifies that a suspicious connection occurs between the encryption key and the
ciphertext. The ciphertext output’s asset trace contains a KEY external asset due to filtering
while the encryption key receives a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset. Therefore, both of the signals
are noted to be vulnerable to attacks.
The next RSA Trojan benchmark, BasicRSA-T200, contains a denial of service attack
against the encryption key. Similar to the previous Trojan, the attack is triggered by a specific
input sequence of plaintext. The Trojan-infested portion of the design can be seen in Figure 17
below.
Trojan: process (indata) is
begin
if indata = x"01fa0301" then
trojanKey <= x"00000001";
end if;
end process Trojan;
Figure 17: Encryption Unit Denial of Service VHDL Example
As the VHDL code shows, the signal trojanKey is assigned a value when a certain string
of plaintext is inserted. This signal is then used as the encryption key for the BasicRSA-T200,
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while the original key is being denied. As in the previous example, it is nearly impossible to test
the scenario in which the specific string of plaintext is inserted, resulting in the denial of service
attack. However, the Trojan detection method identifying denial of service attacks detect this
attack by identifying the internal asset pattern of the original encryption key. Since the original
key signal is replaced by the trojanKey signal, its internal asset pattern is empty, indicating the
presence of a denial of service attack against the encryption unit key.
Another RSA benchmark, BasicRSA-T300, has a similar payload to BasicRSA-T100 in
that it leaks the encryption key. However, it is triggered by a time bomb counter rather than a
specific plaintext string. The time bomb counter process can be seen in Figure 18 below.
Additionally, the payload causing the leakage of the encryption key can be seen in Figure 19
below.
TrojanTrigger: process (ds, reset) is
begin
if reset='1' then
TrojanCounter <= x"00000000";
elsif rising_edge(ds) then
TrojanCounter <= TrojanCounter + 1;
end if;
end process TrojanTrigger;
Figure 18: Time Bomb Counter VHDL Example
if TrojanCounter = x"00000002" then
cypher <= key;
else
cypher <= tempout;
end if;
Figure 19: Encryption Unit Denial of Service VHDL Example
As the two portions of the design show, the time bomb counter will increment on the
rising edge of the ds signal. After incrementing twice, it will leak the encryption key. Two
separate Trojan detection methods identify this attack. First, the same Trojan detection method
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used to identify the Trojan in BasicRSA-T100 detects the leak by identifying the asset pattern of
the output. Second, the Trojan detection method designed to identify time bomb counters detects
the attack by first identifying the fact that TrojanCounter is a counter. After identifying this fact,
the detection method recognizes that it is contained within a conditional statement used to leak
information. Therefore, the TrojanCounter signal is identified as a time bomb counter used as a
trigger for information leakage.
The final RSA benchmark, BasicRSA-T400, contains the same trigger as the BasicRSAT300 benchmark as it uses a time bomb counter. Additionally, the payload of this Trojan is the
same as BasicRSA-T200 as it results in a denial of service attack. Therefore, the detection
methods used for detection in the previous attacks are used to identify the Trojan in this
benchmark.
The next set of Trust-Hub benchmarks consists of several AES encryption units
containing various types of Trojans. These designs are much larger than the RSA examples and
contain several Trojans for each individual example. One particular example in this set of
benchmarks is a large crypto core, which is analyzed for numerous Trojans. However, other
benchmarks in this category are analyzed for Trojans in order to test the detection methods.
Many of the designs in this category contained the same type of Trojans, so not all designs in this
category will be discussed.
The first Trojan attack found in this set of benchmarks consists of the encryption key
being leaked to an instance that is not for encryption. By doing so, the encryption key is leaked
through a shift register acting as a leakage circuit. This attack is found in AES-T600 and AEST2000. By identifying the instance inside the encryption unit is a shift register and the
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encryption has been leaked to it, the circuit is marked as susceptible to an attack leaking the
encryption unit key.
Another Trojan attack found in AES-T600 and AES-T2000 as well as AES-T1800
implement a Trojan intended to drain the battery of the circuit by adding unnecessary circuitry.
The shift register in the previous discussion and in AES-T1800 is the instance used as extra
circuitry. This is detected by noting that there are no outputs found in the instance, as it is being
used only to perform unnecessary computations designed to drain the battery of the circuit. The
Trojan detection method utilizing functionality matching also is used to recognize this Trojan, as
it detects shift registers being contained within encryption units. Therefore, multiple detection
methods are used to identify the same Trojan.
The final major category of Trust-Hub benchmarks consists of the RS232 UART
communication units. The designs consist of a top-level entity with a transmitter instance and a
receiver instance. Several Trojans implemented in this category are identified using previously
discussed Trojan detection methods. However, there are a few new Trojans within this category
that are detected with additional Trojan detection methods.
Several designs in the RS232 category—namely RS232-T600, RS232-T700, and RS232T900—contain malicious FSMs used to activate a Trojan. After a certain sequence is inputted to
the communication unit, it reaches a state that causes the output information to be modified. The
Trojan detection methods pertaining to FSMs are utilized to detect Trojans in these designs. As
the methodology section mentioned, the Trojan FSM detection methods indicate the possibility
of a Trojan and require user interaction for verification. The fact that an input sequence is used
to trigger a specific state could potentially be legitimate. However, in this particular case, once
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the user has been notified of a potential Trojan present, it can be easily verified that the FSM is
being used as a Trojan.
An additional method of Trojan detection utilized in this category of benchmarks is the
matching of blacklisted designs. Due to the fact that these designs use an FSM to implement
Trojan triggers, the internal asset patterns of the Trojan-infested design are significantly different
than the internal asset patterns of the Trojan-free version. Therefore, the GRL matching
algorithm matches the unknown design to a blacklisted functionality when analyzing other
designs with a similar Trojan trigger.
4.3.2 Additional Trojan Examples
After performing unit tests with the Trust-Hub benchmarks for the relevant Trojan
detection methods, the remaining Trojan detection methods were tested by producing designs
containing the corresponding Trojans. The first of the remaining Trojan detection methods
tested is the Trojan resetting the timing signal of the design. This is a simple example to test, as
an internal clock signal assignment was modified to include a reset signal. A sample assignment
statement can be seen below.
Internal_Clock <= Clock AND Reset;
In this scenario, the internal clock is clearly reset rather than being directly driven by the clock
port signal. Therefore, anything driven by the internal clock will experience a denial of service
attack. This attack is detected by analyzing the external asset trace of the timing signals of the
design. In this scenario, the asset trace of the timing signals also contains a filtered RESET asset.
Therefore, the timing signal with a RESET in its asset trace is noted as being vulnerable to a
Trojan. In addition to the clock-reset Trojan detection method, another Trojan detection method
can be used to identify this attack. This Trojan detection method deals more generally with
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denial of service attacks to timing signals by analyzing the internal asset trace of the timing
signals. The denial of service attacks are detected by identifying internal assets indicating that
the signal has been modified, such as CONCURRENT_DRIVEN, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN and
PROCESS_OPERATION_SENSITIVE. In this example, the timing signal’s internal asset trace
contains a CONCURRENT_DRIVEN asset due to the concurrent assignment statement.
Therefore, the signal is also flagged as being vulnerable to a timing denial of service attack.
The Trojans related to suspicious entities contained within register files were tested by
creating connections to malicious instances in a previously secure register file. The first type of
Trojan tested is a counter instance inside a register file. After creating a connection in the
register file, the design was run through the tool, resulting in correct functionality matches for
the register file and the counter. Following the matching of the functionalities, the Trojan
detection method identifies that a TIMING instance is found in a REGISTER_FILE top-level
entity. Therefore, the TIMING instance is correctly flagged as a Trojan. Next, a malicious shift
register was inserted in the register file. Following the same process, both entities are correctly
matched using the GRL. The Trojan detection method consequently flags the shift register as a
suspicious connection, correctly identifying the inserted Trojan.
The next set of Trojan detection methods tested involved attacks on interrupt units. The
first of these attacks involved an interrupt signal being leaked to another component of the
design, resulting in a number of possible failures in the circuit. The unit test that was developed
to test this detection method involved a counter instance being found within an interrupt unit.
The port mapping of this instance can be seen in Figure 20 below.
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trojanCounter: counter
Port Map(C => CLK_I,
CLR => IR(0),
Q => tjCounter);
Figure 20: Counter Instance in Interrupt Unit
When a specific interrupt signal arrives to the interrupt unit, it triggers the counter,
eventually resulting in a denial of service attack against the interrupt unit. However, this same
detection method is valid for detecting other types of attacks to the design. The detection
method identifies an interrupt was sent to a TIMING instance and therefore flags the signal that is
sent to the instance.
Another Trojan detection method deals more generally with denial of service attacks
against interrupt units. In the unit test for this method, the input interrupt signal is being denied
as a result of a Trojan signal being used in its place. The Trojan signal is preset to a value, as the
line below shows.
signal trojanInterrupt : std_logic := '0';
The trojanInterrupt signal is then used in place of the intended interrupt signal. A portion of the
VHDL code can be seen below in Figure 21.
if( trojanInterrupt = '1' ) then
int_pt <= pt(0);
INTR_O <= '1';
next_s <= tx_int_info_priority;
elsif( trojanInterrupt = '1' ) then
int_pt <= pt(1);
INTR_O <= '1';
next_s <= tx_int_info_priority;
end if;
Figure 21: Interrupt Unit Denial of Service Attack
As this example shows, the value of the interrupt signal is preset and not modified,
resulting in a denial of service attack. This attack is detected by analyzing the internal asset
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pattern of the denied interrupt signal and identifying as not being used in the design. Therefore,
the interrupt signal is flagged as being denied, meaning that another signal has taken its place.
The next Trojan detection method tested involved the identification of Trojan triggers in
the form of concurrent assignment statements. These statements are suspicious as they are
involved in activating a signal under a rare circumstance. Because of the limitations of testing,
these rare conditions are often untested, ultimately resulting in the activation of the Trojan by an
attacker. A portion of the example designed to test the Trojan detection method can be seen
below in Figure 22.
b <= A(3) AND A(2) AND A(1) AND A(0);
if (b='1') then
out_data <= '0';
else
out_data <= in_data;
end if;
Figure 22: Trigger Assignment Attack
As this portion of the code shows, the signal b is triggered only when the A vector
reaches its terminal value. As a result, b goes high and the out_data is set to ‘0’. In this
scenario, trigger assignments have the ability to leak information through outputs or cause denial
of service attacks. Therefore, the assignment of b is marked as malicious and presented to the
user.
The next Trojan detection method to be tested involved the leakage of any signals
assigned a CRITICAL output. Users assign CRITICAL assets to signals that should be kept
secure, such as an encryption key or other sensitive data. Therefore, this Trojan detection
method was tested by assigning a CRITICAL asset to an encryption key that was leaked through
an output. Many of the Trust-Hub designs implement this type of Trojan and were therefore
used to test this method. The method detects the information leak by analyzing the asset pattern
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of the output signals. Since the signal with the CRITICAL asset directly drives an output signal,
the output signal contains a filtered CRITICAL asset. Therefore, the output signal is marked as
being susceptible to a leakage of critical information.
4.3.3 Trojan-Infested Crypto Core Example
In order to demonstrate how the Trojan detection methods extend to larger designs,
multiple larger designs were analyzed for Trojans. The first large design example involved the
analysis of a crypto core found in the Trust-Hub benchmarks. Specifically, the design is an AES
core called AES-T600 in the Trust-Hub benchmark. This design contained multiple Trojans
intended to leak the encryption key. Additional Trojans were also added to the design in order to
demonstrate the abilities of multiple Trojan detection algorithms. There were a total of 11 lower
level entities in the design. Although typically negligible, the filtering time for this design took
significantly longer as it was a larger design using many rounds of encryption. The total parse
time took 6 seconds, the total filtering time took 5 minutes and 41 seconds and the Trojan
detection time was negligible. This process was performed on an Apple MacBook Pro with a 2.4
GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 16 GB of RAM.
The first step in analyzing the design was to assign external assets to the primary port
signals. The port signals for the design can be seen in Figure 23. The asset assignment for the
listed port signals was fairly self-explanatory. The clk signal was assigned a SYSTEM_TIMING
external asset, the rst signal was assigned a RESET asset, the in signal was assigned a
DATA_ENCRYPTION asset, the key signal was assigned a KEY asset and the out signal was
assigned a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset.
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ENTITY top IS
PORT (
clk
: IN STD_LOGIC;
rst
: IN STD_LOGIC;
in
: IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127 DOWNTO 0);
key
: IN STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127 DOWNTO 0);
out
: OUT STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(127 DOWNTO 0)
);
END ENTITY top;
Figure 23: Crypto Core Port Signals
Following asset assignment, the assets of the design were filtered throughout the circuit
in order to obtain an asset pattern for the design. The asset pattern was then used in the
functionality matching for the individual entities of the design. The functionality of the top-level
design was correctly matched to an encryption unit. Therefore, the multiple encryption unit
Trojan detection algorithms were used to identify Trojans.
The list of Trojans that were previously inserted into the design began with a time bomb
counter inserted in the final round of encryption. The trigger for this attack can be seen in Figure
24 below. As the figure shows, the Trojan counter increments on the rising edge of the clock.
The counter is used to trigger an information leakage in the final round of encryption. The
payload of the attack is a leakage of the encryption key through the ciphertext output. Therefore,
by knowing the point at which the Trojan counter causes leakage, an attacker can observe the
output of the encryption unit and obtain the key. The information leakage portion of the VHDL
code can be seen in Figure 25 below.
TrojanTrigger: process (clk) is
begin
if rising_edge(clk) then
TrojanCounter <= TrojanCounter + 1;
end if;
end process TrojanTrigger;
Figure 24: AES Time Bomb Trigger
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PROCESS (clk)
BEGIN
IF (clk'EVENT AND clk = '1') THEN
state_out <= (z0 & z1 & z2 & z3);
ELSIF (TrojanCounter = x"44444444") THEN
state_out <= key_in;
END IF;
END PROCESS;
Figure 25: AES Time Bomb Key Leakage
As the portion of code shows, the encryption key is leaked through the output once the
counter reaches the value of “44444444”. This attack is detected by first applying the algorithm
for identifying time bomb counters. By identifying a counter was used in conjunction with a
leakage of information, the TrojanCounter signal is flagged as a trigger for an information
leakage attack while the state_out signal is flagged as the output port signal used to leak the
information. Additionally, this attack is also identified by applying the algorithm of detecting
encryption keys leaking directly to an output. By identifying the asset traces of both the
state_out signal and the key_in signal, the Trojan attack is detected by recognizing the direct
driving assignment between these two signals and that an encryption key could directly leak
through an output port signal.
The next attack found in the AES core involved a Trojan shift register. The concept of a
Trojan shift register was previously addressed when discussing the Trust-Hub benchmarks. The
Trojan shift register is used as additional logic performing a shift operation on the encryption
key. In doing so, it allows attackers to perform power analysis side-channel attack on this
portion of the circuit and thus obtain the value of the encryption key. It is initially triggered by a
time bomb counter incrementing up to a certain value before performing the attack. This attack
is detected in multiple ways. First, since the entity does not contain any outputs, it is
immediately flagged as an inclusion of additional logic. Second, the attack is identified as a
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Trojan shift register through the functionality matching. Finally, the trigger for the attack is
identified as a time bomb counter through the time bomb counter Trojan detection method.
Through the combination of all these Trojan detection methods, the evidence indicates that the
entity in question is malicious.
4.3.4 Trojan-Infested Microcontroller
The final large design intended to test Trojan detection methods involves a
microcontroller with Trojans inserted. This example is different than the previous example in
that the Trojans were not inserted by Trust-Hub or another third party. Instead, the Trojan-free
version of this design was obtained through OpenCores [13] then the Trojans were personally
inserted in various positions throughout the design. This was intended to show the capability of
the Trojan detection methods of finding Trojans in a large design. The design chosen from
OpenCores to be evaluated was termed c16, which is an open-source 16-bit microcontroller. The
design has 19 lower level entities, such as a register file, an ALU, and a communication unit.
This design was chosen due to the fact that it was already written in VHDL and required minimal
modifications to be parsed by the tool. The total parse time for the design was 18 seconds, the
filtering time was 11 seconds and the Trojan detection time was negligible.
Following the parsing process of the design, assets were assigned to the primary port
signals. Since the design was significantly larger than the unit tests, it was imperative to assign
correct assets to the signals in order to adequately represent the functionality of the signal. This
is needed because the signal is filtered throughout a much larger design; and, if the signal is
assigned to an incorrect asset then that asset propagates throughout a much larger space than if
the design was smaller. The port signals of the microcontroller can be seen in Figure 26 below.
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Additionally, the asset assignment of the primary port signals from Figure 26 can be seen in
Table 16 below.
entity board_cpu is
PORT (CLK40
SWITCH
SER_IN
SER_OUT
TEMP_SPO
TEMP_SPI
CLK_OUT
LED
ENABLE_N
DEACTIVATE_N
TEMP_CE
TEMP_SCLK
SEG1
SEG2
XM_ADR
XM_CE_N
XM_OE_N
XM_WE_N
XM_DIO
);
end board_cpu;

: in STD_LOGIC;
: in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (9 downto 0);
: in STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: in STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0);
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0);
: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0);
: out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(15 downto 0);
: out STD_LOGIC;
: out STD_LOGIC;
: in STD_LOGIC;
: in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(7 downto 0)

Figure 26: Microcontroller Primary Port Signals
TABLE 16: Microcontroller Asset Assignment
Signal
Asset
CLK40
SYSTEM_TIMING
SWITCH
DATA_PERIPHERAL
SER_IN
DATA_COMMUNICATION
SER_OUT
DATA_COMMUNICATION
TEMP_SPO
DATA_PERIPHERAL
TEMP_SPI
DATA_PERIPHERAL
CLK_OUT
SYSTEM_TIMING
LED
DATA_PERIPHERAL
ENABLE_N
ENABLE
DEACTIVATE_N STATUS
TEMP_CE
PERIPHERAL_CONTROL
TEMP_SCLK
SUBSYSTEM_TIMING
SEG1
DATA_PERIPHERAL
SEG2
DATA_PERIPHERAL
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TABLE 16: Microcontroller Asset Assignment (Cont.)
Signal
Asset
XM_ADR
ADDRESS_SENSITIVE
XM_CE_N
ENABLE
XM_OE_N
ENABLE
XM_WE_N
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL
XM_DIO
DATA_COMMUNICATION
The first of the Trojans inserted in the design is a denial of service attack found in the
ALU. The attack targets the ALU instruction signal used to determine which operation is to be
performed. By controlling the instruction signal, an attacker has the ability to control which
operation is to be performed by the ALU, therefore rendering it useless. The Trojan was inserted
as an additional signal, called ALU_OP_Trojan, that could be pre-programmed by an attacker
while the original ALU instruction signal was denied. A portion of the FSM controlled by the
Trojan signal can be seen in Figure 27 below.
case ALU_OP_Trojan is
when
ALU_MD_FIN => -- mult/div
if (QP_NEG = '0') then
ZZ <= PROD_REM(15 downto 0);
else
ZZ <= X"0000" - PROD_REM(15 downto 0);
end if;
when
others =>
-- modulo
if (RM_NEG = '0') then
ZZ <= PROD_REM(31 downto 16);
else
ZZ <= X"0000" - PROD_REM(31 downto 16);
end if;
end case;
Figure 27: ALU Denial of Service
With the Trojan signal controlling the FSM, the outputs from the ALU are untrusted.
This attack was detecting by identifying that the original ALU instruction signal, called
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ALU_OP, was being denied since the design was being controlled by a Trojan instruction signal.
Therefore, the original ALU instruction signal was flagged as a part of a denial of service attack.
The next attack involved the insertion of a malicious state to an FSM contained within
the memory component of the design. The Trojan-free FSM typically contains an “OTHERS”
state that handles remaining states that are not listed. The Trojan-free version of the FSM can be
seen in Figure 28 below.
case LADR is
when "0001" =>
when others =>
end case;

RDAT <= OUT_1;
RDAT <= OUT_0;

Figure 28: Trojan-free Memory FSM
As the example shows, when the LADR signal has a value of “0001”, the OUT_1 signal is
assigned to the RDAT output signal. When the LADR has any other value, the OUT_0 signal is
assigned to the RDAT output signal. However, the inserted Trojan results in the modification of
the default value for the FSM. The Trojan-infested version of the FSM can be seen in Figure 29
below.
case LADR is
when "0001" =>
when "0010" =>
end case;

RDAT <= OUT_1;
RDAT <= trojanOut;

Figure 29: Trojan-infested Memory FSM
As the Trojan-infested version shows, the “OTHERS” case has been removed and
replaced with a state occurring when the LADR value is “0010”. When this state is reached, an
incorrect value is assigned to the RDAT signal. Additionally, any case other than the two listed
will not result in a change in the value of the RDAT output. Therefore, this attack has modified
the output data that is assigned to the RDAT signal. This attack was detected using the FSM
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Trojan detection methods. First, because the case statement does not contain an “OTHERS”
state and not all states are listed, it is flagged as susceptible to the insertion of a Trojan as a
malicious state. Additionally, it is marked as susceptible to a gate-level Trojan inserted since not
all states are accounted for. Therefore, this attack was detected by identifying the missing states
in the FSM.
The next attack was inserted inside the UART communication unit resulting in a
transmission of incorrect data. The attack was triggered by a counter signal that counted on the
rising edge of the clock. The transmission of serial data was disrupted when the Trojan counter
reached a certain value. The Trojan payload occurred when the most significant bit of the Trojan
counter is equal to zero. The VHDL code can be seen in Figure 30 below.
if TrojanCounter(31) = '1' then
SER_OUT <= "1";
else
SER_OUT <= BUF(0);
end if;
Figure 30: UART Trojan Attack
This scenario only occurs when the most significant bit of the Trojan counter goes high,
and therefore it takes a significant amount of time to occur. This scenario is also very time
consuming to test, thus it is rarely caught through functional testing. However, the time bomb
counter Trojan detection method identifies the inclusion of the time bomb counter and
subsequently identifies any signals triggered by the counter signal. Therefore, both the time
bomb counter signal and the serial out signal are flagged as a part of a Trojan attack.
The final Trojan inserted into the microcontroller is another instance of additional logic
in the form of a shift register. The shift register was similar to the one presented in the previous
example of the crypto core. Even though this example was previously tested, it was important to
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test it in a larger design in order to guarantee the identification of the malicious logic when there
were significantly more entities to analyze. The shift register was inserted in the data core entity
of the design and was intended to leak data from memory to an attacker. The port mapping of
the Trojan shift register can be seen in Figure 31 below.
--Trojan Shift Register
ShiftRegister: TSC
Port Map(clk => CLK_I,
rst => CLR,
data_leak => RDAT,
Tj_Trig => tjTrigger);
Figure 31: Trojan Shift Register Port Map
As the VHDL code shows, the RDAT signal of the data core was leaked to the shift
register and therefore leaked to an attacker. The Trojan shift register’s internal characteristics
are the same as the previous example’s shift register’s characteristics. The shift register entity
does not contain an output and was used as additional logic designed to leak the input
information. The Trojan shift register was detected using the same algorithms as before. It was
analyzed and found to contain no outputs, and therefore was marked as additional logic that
could be utilized by a malicious attacker to leak information.
4.4 Analysis
As the previous sections noted, the Golden Reference Library matching as well as the
Trojan detection methods produced successful results. The matching methodology was
subjected to numerous rounds of testing to determine its ability to match an unknown design to a
functionality successfully. Before specific assets were developed, the matching results were
occasionally incorrect when dealing with general assets. However, after incorporating the
specific assets, the matching methodology was successful in matching an unknown design to a
functionality. Additionally, the output report of the percentage match gives the user an
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indication of the other designs that matched closely in the case of an outlier as well as presenting
the user with the average match of a functionality. These provide the user with additional
information that can assist in the evaluation of an unknown design. Overall, the matching
methodology is very successful in evaluating unknown designs due to the specificity of asset
assignment and the large GRL used in comparison.
Additionally, the Trojan detection portion of the project successfully analyzes unknown
designs for potential Trojans. As the previous sections have described, the Trust-Hub
benchmarks were the major source of verification for the Trojan detection methods. After
implementing Trojan detection methods for all the Trojans found in the benchmarks, additional
test vehicles were developed to illustrate the effectiveness of the remaining Trojan detection
methods. Finally, the Trojan detection methods were tested using large designs to ensure that
Trojans could still be identified. During all of the testing phases, the Trojan detection methods
successfully identified the entire set of Trojans. Therefore, the false negative rate for the Trojan
detection methods was 0%.
A limitation of the matching methodology involves matching a large design with many
level of hierarchy. Large designs incorporate internal signals mapped to lower level instances
and the internal signals do not receive external assets during the asset assignment phase.
Therefore, as the internal signals are connected to lower levels of the hierarchy, the asset pattern
of the lower level entities includes the assets of signals that were not assigned an external asset.
Additionally, the asset assignment at the top level of a design often requires more general assets
since the signal at the top level is mapped to multiple lower level entities. The result of these
issues is that the functionality assignment of the lowest level entities is not as accurate as entities
higher in the hierarchy of the design.
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Although the Trojan detection methodology accurately identifies the Trojans with a false
negative rate of zero, the Trojan detection methods consist of a non-zero false positive rate. The
ultimate goal of the Trojan detection methods was to produce a false negative rate of zero and in
that respect the Trojan detection methods were successful. In order to allow a false negative rate
of zero, the false positive rate was non-zero. However, the false positive rate is not a significant
hindrance in determining the location of Trojans. Additionally, the false positive rate for the
Trojan detection varied among the individual Trojan detection methods. The overall final false
positive rate for all Trojan detection methods is 4.4%.
Of the set of Trojan detection method false positives, certain false positives were to be
expected and are due to the nature of the Trojan detection methods. First of all, the limitations of
the parser cause occasional false positives to occur in Trojan detection methods involving the use
of internal assets. Certain VHDL syntax cannot be recognized by the parser in order to assign
appropriate internal assets to the signal. For example, the use of the “when” keyword in a
concurrent statement cannot be recognized by the parser. An example of this type of VHDL
statement can be seen in Figure 32 below.
WR_0 <= '1' when (WR = '1' and ADR(15 downto 12) = "0000" ) else '0';
WR_1 <= '1' when (WR = '1' and ADR(15 downto 12) = "0001" ) else '0';
Figure 32: VHDL Concurrent Statements
In the statement above, the WR signal ideally should receive a conditionally driving asset
since it is used to determine the outputs WR_0 and WR_1. However, the parser does not
recognize signals found in the condition of the “when” statement resulting in no internal assets
assigned to the WR signal. Therefore, detection methods that involve analyzing the internal
assets of a signal, such as the denial of service methods, are susceptible to attacks involving the
“when” statements that are not identified by the parser. Since the priority of the Trojan detection
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process was to ensure a zero false negative rate, the Trojan detection methods assumed a worstcase scenario. The result is that the false negative rate is indeed zero, but the false positive rate
incurs a penalty.
Additionally, some Trojan detection methods incur a larger false positive rate because of
how the detection method is implemented. Some of the Trojan detection methods are treated as
warnings against possible malicious intentions by attackers rather than certainties of a Trojan
insertion. For example, one of the FSM Trojan detection methods identifies FSMs that are
vulnerable to Trojan insertion at the gate level. Even if no attack occurs at the gate level, this
Trojan detection method identifies the potential for a Trojan to be inserted. The driving
objective behind these Trojan detection methods, as has been stated frequently, is identifying all
Trojans in the design. Therefore, some of the Trojan detection methods, such as the FSM
method mentioned, present the user with the possibility that a Trojan could have been inserted.
The Trojan detection report allows the user to quickly identify the locations of the potential
Trojans and determine the validity of the detection method.
Determining the false positive rate of the Trojan detection methods requires finding all
false positives within the sample space then dividing this number by the sum of the false
positives and the true negatives. The true negatives are the cases when the Trojan detection
methods correctly identified the absence of a Trojan. There was a range of false positive rates
found among the Trojan detection methods. Some Trojan detection methods received a 0% false
positive rate as no false positives had been detected. The highest false positive rate found among
the Trojan detection method was the time bomb counter detection method, which received a 20%
false positive rate. While this number is high, the Trojan detection method was designed to
identify all Trojans, necessitating the presence of false positives. Additionally, this Trojan

74

detection method, along with other detection methods that have a high false positive rate, would
require analyzing the intention for a signal, which is very difficult to perform. Consequently, the
false positive rates for these types of Trojans are higher than others that are more distinctly
malicious. Therefore, for the Trojans with higher false positive rates, the user is required to
analyze the design further to determine whether a Trojan has actually been inserted. When all of
the false positive rates were averaged together, the previously presented value of 4.4% was
determined as the overall false positive rate.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary
The objectives presented at the outset were successfully attained throughout the course of
the project. The number of assets was significantly increased in order to provide greater
diversity to asset patterns. Furthermore, a Golden Reference Library and functionality matching
methodology were created, allowing an unknown design to be analyzed and matched to a known
design. Finally, hardware Trojan detection methods were introduced to the Structural Checking
methodology by utilizing the Golden Reference Library matching as well as analyzing internal
characteristics of a hardware design. Each of these key objectives was implemented and
thoroughly tested.
This project provides significant progress in the area of hardware Trojan detection,
specifically with regard to the Structural Checking methodology. Within the larger realm of
hardware Trojan detection, this methodology detects very small hardware Trojans, a limitation of
many other hardware Trojan detection methods. Additionally, by using this methodology,
hardware Trojans are detected pre-fabrication, saving IC design companies the significant cost of
testing for hardware Trojans. With respect to the Structural Checking methodology, this project
has increased the capabilities of asset assignment as well as introduced the implementation of the
completely new features of a Golden Reference Library and hardware Trojan detection.
5.2 Future Work
Several steps can be taken in order to further improve the Structural Checking
methodology. First, as more trusted designs are analyzed, the asset patterns associated with
these designs can be added to the GRL. This allows for the matching methodology to be more
robust as more designs are added. Additionally, as more Trojan attacks are discovered,

76

corresponding Trojan detection methods can be developed to identify these attacks.
Additionally, the Trojan detection methods currently being used can be modified to further
reduce the false positive rate associated with each method. Finally, additional steps can be taken
to better match lower level entities of large designs to a functionality.
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